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INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIA | OIL AND GAS
OCTOBER 2017
Russian Oil and Gas
Tomorrow is a Distant Memory
█ The capital misallocation observed at Rosneft over the past several years
shows no signs of abating. This casts doubt on our and others’ financial
forecasts, which assume a halt to acquisitions, reduction
in capital
investments and rise in net income and dividends. The company’s strategy
needs to change markedly for any of these things to materialize.
█ Strong European sales, modest growth in gas prices and Gazprom Neft’s
improved profitability in refined products will all serve to boost Gazprom’s
numbers this year and next. We raise the stock to an opportunistic BUY but
remain skeptical of its long(cid:2)term value.
█ Lukoil might make a decision on its treasury shares, which represent a sixth of
its share capital, before its strategy day in early 2018. Coupled with strong
cash flow generation and a rising dividend, this could reinvigorate the stock.
Gazprom Neft, meanwhile, will likely reinstate interim dividends and should
swing back to positive free cash flow in 2018. Lukoil, Gazprom Neft and
Novatek are our top calls for the next 12 months.
█ Tatneft’s share price has risen 25% since the news of the dividend hike in late
April. The stock is now approaching its fair value, and we downgrade it to a
HOLD. Our strategy team, however, expects accelerated inflows into Russian
equities as the discount rate shrinks. Tatneft’s shares could outperform on
this, given its heavy weighting in the MSCI index relative to its free float.
█ Recent changes in the shareholder structure and the expected decline in capex
increase the chances that Transneft will hike dividends next year, which leads
us to raise the stock to a HOLD. The valuation, however, still looks rich to us.
█ We intend to remove Bashneft from Under Review after the company’s
dividend policy becomes clearer, possibly in November.
█ The Urals price will likely average about $52/bbl this year. We leave our
2017E and longer(cid:2)term assumption at $50/bbl for easier comparison across
years, meaning earnings should slightly exceed our 2017E forecasts.
Stocks under our coverage
P/E
EV/EBITDA
Target price, $
Rec
2017E 2018E 2017E 2018E New Previous
Gazprom
Lukoil
Novatek
Gazprom Neft
Surgutneftegaz commons/prefs
Tatneft
Rosneft
Transneft
KazMunaiGas EP
Bashneft
5.6
6.5
18.3
4.7
4.3
7.8
13.6
6.9
4.6
5.5
3.7
6.0
15.6
4.1
5.6
7.5
9.8
6.8
6.2
3.6
3.2
3.4
11.0
3.9
neg
4.9
7.0
4.1
neg
3.4
2.7
3.1
11.2
3.8
neg
4.5
6.1
4.0
neg
2.7
2.75
65.00
155
5.50
0.50
8.00
5.00
2,750
10.00
UR
2.75 BUY (from HOLD)
65.00 BUY
155 BUY
5.50 BUY
0.50 HOLD/BUY
8.00 HOLD (from BUY)
6.00 SELL (from HOLD)
2,500 HOLD (from SELL)
10.00 HOLD
UR UR
Current
price, $
2.20
52.50
117
4.00
0.52
7.40
5.70
3,250
9.65
37.00
Note: Prices as of October 17, 2017. Our target price for Surgutneftegaz is simply the market price, as the investment cases
for both share classes are not based on fundamentals (see our July 2016 report for more).
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Alex Fak
Valery Nesterov
Anna Kotelnikova
+7 (495) 933 9829
Alex_Fak@sberbank-cib.ru
+7 (495) 933 9832
Valery_Nesterov@sberbank-cib.ru
+7 (495) 787 2382
Anna_Kotelnikova@sberbank-cib.ru
In accordance with US SEC Regulation AC, important US regulatory disclosures and analyst certification can be found on the last page of this report.
research@sberbank-cib.ru, http://research.sberbank-cib.com
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Contents
Report Summary ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3
Rosneft: We Need to Talk About Igor ………………………………………………………………………………….. 4
China Gas Imports: The Phantom Pipeline …………………………………………………………………………….. 30
What Happened to the Russian Arctic? ………………………………………………………………………………. 38
Valuations …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 51
Financial Profiles ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 52
2
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
Report Summary
The persistent lure of unlikely promises is the theme that unites this report.
The capital misallocation observed at Rosneft in recent years shows no signs of abating. This casts
doubt on the relevance of the market’s financial forecasts, which assume no future acquisitions and
a reduction in capital investments.
The problem is that Rosneft’s organic growth will be too slow to satisfy its CEO’s ambitions. Crude
output from the current assets will grow at 1.8% per year, a respectable rate compared to the rest
of the sector but still leaving output just 10% higher in five years’ time. Tax incentives will mean that
upstream profitability expands faster than volumes, but most of the tax benefits will expire in the
foreseeable future. Gas output will grow much faster than crude oil production, but Rosneft’s gas is
much less profitable than its oil, and the expansion of this business will contribute less than $1 bln
to EBITDA growth. Guidance on the downstream program is confusing and uncertain.
Meanwhile, Rosneft’s brownfield cash costs have grown steadily over the past few years and are
now no better than the sector average. The company has also made $22 bln of acquisitions since
incorporating TNK(cid:2)BP in 2013 and invested over $8 bln in Venezuela, expanding its debt load in the
process. The company’s strange approach to accounting means that shareholders will this year
receive less than two thirds of the dividends to which they are entitled.
A bullish or even a neutral stance on Rosneft must assume that all these factors will reverse: that
Rosneft will cut costs, take a pause on acquisitions, quit supporting Venezuela, clean up its income
statement, generate lots of cash flow and use it to deleverage and reward shareholders. However, the
CEO, who unilaterally sets the strategy at Rosneft, shows no visible inclination to change his ways.
Improvement in capital allocation – most importantly, deleveraging – remains the key risk to our
long(cid:2)term bearish case on the company. On the other hand, Rosneft is no longer significantly
overweighted in the MSCI index relative to its free float, which reduces the risk of staying
underweight in its shares.
Line D, the planned fourth gas pipeline from Central Asia to China with the capacity to bring an
extra 30 bcm of gas, may or may not be under construction. Nobody can tell. The pipeline is
supposed to deviate from the first three links, taking a detour through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
The delay could be due to problems developing phase 2 of the Galkynysh field in Turkmenistan, or
finding gas in Tajikistan, or the simple fact that building the link is more expensive than importing
gas as LNG. China might also be waiting for Turkmenistan to offer the gas at a discount in order to
incentivize the construction. The cancellation of Line D would boost the chances of a Chinese major
taking a substantial stake in Novatek’s Arctic LNG(cid:2)2 project. That project is due to deliver, in roughly
the same time frame, about the same volume as Line D would.
After six years, we return to the offshore Arctic, only to find that not much has been happening there.
Are the sanctions at fault? We discover that the main problem is that most of the deposits in the region
are gas, and gas has become much less profitable to develop since Gazprom and Total abandoned
their Stokman project back in 2011. However, the Russian government believes that a combination of
tax incentives, ample oil resources and clearing up the Northern Sea Route could lure back investors.
So far, only Rosneft is taking the bait. This will cost its shareholders billions of dollars.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
3
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Rosneft: We Need to Talk About Igor
Ensconced in one’s financial model and dutifully plugging in the company’s operating guidance, it is easy
to become positive on Rosneft’s stock. On paper, things seem to be shaping up nicely: tax(cid:2)preferential oil
production and gas output are rising, and there will be a modest improvement in the downstream. Free
cash flow is set to surge and accounting items bringing down the net income should lapse, which in
theory should lead to deleveraging and a dividend that will yield around 9% by 2020. Rosneft appears
poised to churn up lots of cash flow in the future and share it with investors.
But much of this was set to happen back in 2013, after Rosneft had consolidated TNK(cid:2)BP. Investors
assumed the company would step back, deleverage and digest the new business – especially once the oil
price collapsed in late 2014 and the company came under US and European sanctions. Instead, Rosneft
has spent a net of $22 bln on acquisitions since then, with no clear focus. Just over the past 12 months, it
has made purchases in the Russian upstream and downstream, Indian refining, Egyptian gas, a
downstream swap in Germany and significant investments into Venezuela.
Meanwhile, its debt has grown and its cost control has deteriorated. Capital expenditures this year will be
the highest in the company’s history.
Rosneft’s net debt since 2013, $ bln
Rosneft’s capex since the incorporation of TNK(cid:2)BP, R bln
Showed some sign of declining over
2015(cid:2)16 but increased with the purchase
of Bashneft in 4Q16. It is now higher than
after the TNK(cid:2)BP transaction.
78
76
74
72
70
68
66
64
62
3
1
Q
1
3
1
Q
2
3
1
Q
3
3
1
Q
4
4
1
Q
1
4
1
Q
2
4
1
Q
3
4
1
Q
4
5
1
Q
1
5
1
Q
2
5
1
Q
3
5
1
Q
4
6
1
Q
1
6
1
Q
2
6
1
Q
3
6
1
Q
4
7
1
Q
1
7
1
Q
2
Note: Includes prepayments received.
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
875
709
560
533
595
The year Rosneft came under sanctions and
future financing options were unclear.
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
We conclude that beyond 2019 organic growth will be too little to move the needle for the company.
Under normal circumstances, the post(cid:2)investment cycle would provide an opportunity to concentrate
on free cash flow generation and deleveraging. But will this happen? This is where we must venture
out from under the shelter of our model and try to come to grips with Rosneft’s plans. We believe that
without addressing the longer(cid:2)term strategy, a durable view on the stock is impossible. And that
means talking about the man in charge.
From extensive discussions, we have come to the conclusion that Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin almost
single(cid:2)handedly sets the company’s strategy. Such unilateral decision(cid:2)making is unique in our
coverage. And as we discuss in more detail below, we believe that eschewing further expansion to trim
down the debt will not suit Rosneft’s CEO. Assuming he remains in charge, the company will continue
to pursue volume growth. In doing so, its heft will push it further out of Russia and perhaps further out
of oil. This will only disappoint its shareholders.
4
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
Modest organic growth any way you slice it
Rosneft has presented three main sources of organic growth over the next several years: crude oil
greenfield expansion, the gas business and downstream improvements.
Rosneft’s 2017E consolidated liquids output in Russia
10%
34%
Total:
4.3 mln bpd
56%
TNK(cid:2)BP
Bashneft
Yukos/Rosneft legacy
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
The company’s attributable production accounts for almost 40% of Russia’s output. It is no wonder,
then, that it also boasts the longest list of greenfields in the country. This includes three of the four so(cid:2)
called “old generation” greenfield projects, launched around 2008 – Vankor, Verkhnechonsk and the
Uvat group of fields. Vankor’s production is in decline, so Rosneft has begun talking about the “Vankor
cluster,” including Suzun, Tagul and Lodochnoye fields. Production at Uvat and Verkhnechonsk is being
sustained, though also in a “cluster” manner, by gradually bringing online new satellite fields.
Rosneft’s greenfields
Project
Region
Launch year
Peak output, kbpd
Peak year
”Old generation”
Vankor
Uvat group
Verkhnechonsk
”New generation”
Erginskoye + Kondaneft (Rosneft guidance)
Russkoye
Srednebotuobinskoye (Taas(cid:2)Yuryakh)
Messoyakha (50% share)*
Tagul
Yurubcheno(cid:2)Tokhomskoye
Trebs & Titov
Rospan (mostly condensate)
Suzun
Kuyumba (50% share)*
Burneftegaz
Lodochnoye
Labagan
Naul
Peak output by region
East Siberia
West Siberia
Timano(cid:2)Pechora
East Siberia
West Siberia
East Siberia
West Siberia
East Siberia
East Siberia
East Siberia
East Siberia
East Siberia
Timano(cid:2)Pechora
West Siberia
East Siberia
East Siberia
West Siberia
East Siberia
Timano(cid:2)Pechora
Timano(cid:2)Pechora
2009
2009
2009
2018
2018
2013
2016
2018
2017
2013
2006
2016
2018
2013
2021
2015
2017
2014
2016
2015
2022
2023
2020
2024
2022
2021
2019
2020
2017
2022
2016
2024
2019
2019
442
233
174
150
130
110
110
100
100
95
95
90
75
47
40
30
30
2,051
1,371
525
155
* Rosneft holds a 50% share in the Messoyakha and Kuyumba projects (the latter via its stake in Slavneft); peak output shown per Rosneft’s share.
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Rosneft’s attributable liquids output in Russia should grow at just under a 2% clip over the next five
years. This rate is front(cid:2)loaded and tapers off to zero by 2022.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
5
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Rosneft’s liquids output growth in Russia, 2017(cid:2)22E, kbpd
5,200
5,000
4,800
4,600
4,400
4,200
4,000
3,800
4,348
E
7
1
0
2
t
u
p
t
u
O
160
(cid:2)
o
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e
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90
93
114
149
57
47
47
33
374
Attempts to stabilize production at
this core brownfield unit have led to
the doubling of capex since 2014,
to almost $3.5 bln this year.
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* Suzun, Tagul and Lodochnoye.
** including all brownfield production (Rosneft, TNK(cid:2)BP and Bashneft); Vankor, Uvat and Verkhnechonsk; and 50% stakes in Slavneft, Tomskneft and
Udmurtneft.
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Interestingly, the biggest single contribution to consolidated output is supposed to come from two
projects purchased just this year: Kondaneft and Erginskoye, which neighbor each other and are satellites
of the giant Priobskoye field. There is some doubt, however, about Rosneft’s guidance for the 4 mln
tonne (80 kbpd) peak from Kondaneft. The development of the project’s four fields is focused on the
difficult Tyumen layers, which are characterized by deep and diffuse pay zones of relatively low thickness.
Rosneft bought the assets for R40 bln ($0.7 bln) from Independent Petroleum Company (Russian
abbreviation: NNK), which is run by Rosneft’s former president Eduard Khudainatov. Back in late 2013,
with the oil price above $100/bbl, estimates presented to NNK’s management indicated that the plateau
at Kondaneft could only reach 0.5 mln tonnes (10 kbpd) and that the development of the fields would
not make back the investment. The fields enjoy a modest MET discount (back in 2012, when we first
wrote about Tyumen layers, we estimated that they would need a full MET waiver to have any hope of
being profitable).
Which is Kondaneft’s likely production curve?
5
4
3
2
1
0
2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Rosneft guidance
NNK’s internal estimate (2013)
Source: Rosneft, NNK, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
This likewise casts some doubt on the projected output of Erginskoye, which has a similar geology to
Kondaneft and is estimated to peak at 3.5 mln tonnes (70 kbpd).
6
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
Sources of Rosneft’s attributable liquids output growth, 2017E(cid:2)2022E, kbpd (total: +416 kbpd)
149
114
97
90
84
75
57
47
22
20
20
5
(cid:2)
(cid:2)
200
150
100
50
0
(50)
(100)
(150)
(200)
(250)
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* including all brownfield production (Rosneft, TNK(cid:2)BP and Bashneft) and 50% stakes in Slavneft, Tomskneft and Udmurtneft.
Source: Company, Bashneft, press reports, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
(25)
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If we take the company’s projections for Kondaneft and Erginskoye at face value, the almost 2% annual
growth would mean that Rosneft’s liquids production would rise at double the pace that we expect for
Russia as a whole. However, it would still mean less than 10% more barrels by 2022 than this year.
Attributable liquids production growth, 2017E(cid:2)2022E CAGR
6.0%
4.0%
2.0%
0.0%
(cid:2)2.0%
(cid:2)4.0%
4.0%
2.7%
1.8%
Rosneft bought a company whose output
should peak in 2019 before declining to
roughly the current levels by 2022.
1.0% 0.8%
0.1% 0.1%
t
f
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s
(
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
(cid:2)2.5%
t
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s
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R
(cid:2)1.3%
z
a
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Another way to look at this growth is to measure the varying profitability from the fields. We first
addressed this approach in our October 2016 report on Lukoil. Russian greenfields (and,
occasionally, certain older fields) enjoy tax concessions of various kinds: regional and offshore MET
rebates, preferential MET treatment for depleted acreage and heavy oil, and in a few cases a
reduced export duty. The difference in taxation accounts for most of the difference in profitability
between new and older fields.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
7
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Comparative profitability of Rosneft’s liquids, $/bbl (starting in 2018)
Revenues MET
Export
duty
Lifting
cost
Transport
cost
EBITDA Profit
tax***
OCF
OCF
brownfield
ratio
Tax
burden****
% of
output*****
Standard Russian brownfield
50.0 17.6
11.5
Srednebotuobinskoye (Taas Yuryakh)
Kuyumba (50%)*
Messoyakha (50%)*
Labagan/Naul
Trebs & Titov
Yurubcheno(cid:2)Tokhomskoye
Rospan**
Suzun
Tagul
Russkoye
Lodochnoye
Bashneft’s brownfield (attributable to Rosneft)
Uvat group
Erginskoye + Kondaneft
Rosneft’s legacy brownfield ex(cid:2)Samotlor
Verkhnechonsk
Burneftegas
Samotlor
7.4
53.8
7.4
53.8
7.4
51.9
7.4
50.8
7.4
50.8
7.4
53.8
8.0
50.0
7.4
51.9
7.4
51.9
7.4
51.9
51.9 15.6
50.0 13.5
53.8 17.6
50.0 15.6
50.0 15.5
53.8 17.6
50.0 17.6
50.0 13.8
(cid:2)
(cid:2)
(cid:2)
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
11.5
4.3
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
5.1
3.2
0.5
3.2
3.2
6.5
3.2
5.7
3.2
3.2
3.6
4.3
3.2
7.2
4.9
5.9
5.9
5.1
1.9
0.4
5.9
4.4
5.1
5.1
5.1
4.4
3.4
5.9
4.4
4.4
5.9
4.4
4.4
11.7
37.3
37.3
36.1
26.8
26.4
25.8
25.5
24.6
24.6
21.4
17.1
15.8
15.5
15.3
15.0
14.5
13.2
13.1
2.3
9.3
7.5 29.8
7.5 29.8
7.2 28.9
5.4 21.4
5.3 21.1
5.2 20.6
5.1 20.4
4.9 19.7
4.9 19.7
4.3 17.1
3.4 13.7
3.2 12.7
3.1 12.4
3.1 12.2
3.0 12.0
2.9 11.6
2.6 10.6
2.6 10.5
2.5
2.5
2.4
1.8
1.8
1.7
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.4
1.1
1.1
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
63%
28%
28%
28%
48%
48%
45%
49%
46%
46%
45%
59%
56%
60%
60%
60%
60%
64%
56%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
2%
2%
2%
1%
2%
0%
4%
5%
2%
63%
4%
1%
8%
Note: East Siberian fields enjoy better pricing than fields in West Siberia but also have higher transport costs; some fields have mixed export destinations. Srednebotuobinskoye, Kuyumba and
Messoyakha enjoy what amounts to a full export duty waiver for the first several years of production.
* not consolidated in financials; assume to be monetized via dividends
** Rospan’s condensate will mostly be injected into the Urals crude oil pipeline stream, therefore garnering no pricing premium
*** profit tax estimates assume no regional discounts
**** tax burden as a percent of revenues
***** percentage of Rosneft’s attributable output over 2018(cid:2)22
Source: Company, press reports, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Rosneft naturally enjoys more tax concessions, in absolute terms, than any other company in Russia. We
estimate that their total value will approach $7 bln by 2019. But relative to its size, Rosneft until recently
enjoyed the lowest boost from tax breaks among the large integrated players. With the acquisition of
Bashneft (whose upstream is heavily subsidized) and the recent deal with the Finance Ministry for a 10(cid:2)
year rebate on the Samotlor field worth R35 bln ($0.6 bln) per year, this has changed somewhat.
Boost to EBITDA from various tax concessions, 2018E
Among the oldest producers in Russia, with
significant depleted(cid:2)field tax breaks, which
more than doubles their EBITDA.
The incorporation of tax(cid:2)subsidized
Bashneft and the granting of the partial
MET rebate to Samotlor means that tax
breaks now contribute more to
Rosneft’s EBITDA than to Lukoil’s.
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Tatneft
Bashneft
Surgutneftegaz
Gazprom Neft
Rosneft
Lukoil
Onshore greenfields
Offshore greenfields
Heavy oil
Depleted/smaller fields and greenfields
Samotlor
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Still, the really profitable fields – those generating twice or more the operating cash flow per barrel
as Rosneft’s brownfield – will account for just 4(cid:2)6% of Rosneft’s attributable output over the next
five years. For Lukoil, by comparison, that proportion is about 16%. Moreover, the juiciest tax
breaks will expire as early as 2019(cid:2)20 (for Taas(cid:2)Yuryakh and Trebs & Titov), or in 2022(cid:2)24
(Kuyumba, Messoyakha, Yurubcheno(cid:2)Tokhomskoye and Suzun). Finally, Rosneft will share two of
the most profitable assets – Kuyumba and Messoyakha, which enjoy rare export duty holidays –
with Gazprom Neft, and will not consolidate them in its financials. (Kuyumba is actually owned by
8
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
Slavneft, though this may change by the time it comes online.) By contrast, Lukoil will consolidate all
of its profitable greenfields apart from its 25% stake in the Trebs & Titov project.
Growth from new fields and acquisitions could be restated in brownfield(cid:2)equivalent terms – what
we termed “cash barrels” in our report on Lukoil. While Rosneft’s crude oil production in barrel
terms will grow at 1.8% CAGR over the next five years, in “cash barrel” terms it will rise at a 2.8%
rate. By 2025, there will be almost no difference between the two measures, unless some of the
current tax breaks are extended.
Rosneft’s barrels and “cash barrels” growth
120
115
110
105
100
95
90
Profit volume CAGR 2017(cid:2)22: 2.8%
Volume CAGR 2017(cid:2)22: 1.8%
Volume and profit volume CAGR 2017(cid:2)22: 0.4%
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
2021E
2022E
2023E
2024E
2025E
* brownfield(cid:2)equivalent production in terms of operating cash flows
Note: Index: 2017= 100.
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Barrels
Cash barrels*
We estimate that Rosneft’s consolidated volume growth will contribute 15 mtpa (300 kbpd), just
half the 30 mtpa (600 kbpd) organic liquids production growth that Rosneft is guiding by 2022.
Another 6 mln tonnes (120 kbpd) will come from Rosneft’s claim on non(cid:2)consolidated Messoyakha
and Kuyumba output. Perhaps in its guidance the company means to compare the number to pre(cid:2)
Bashneft 2016, but in that case the growth is not organic and is back(cid:2)dated. Or perhaps it expects
rising output from its Venezuelan joint ventures, where its share of output was 2.7 mln tonnes in
2016 and is on track to rise by about 30% this year. The latter is unlikely, but if that’s what Rosneft
means then the growth would be irrelevant, as Venezuela is more likely to continue to draw cash
from Rosneft, not the other way around. (We discuss this further on.)
The myth of Rosneft’s efficiency
When the management presents its five(cid:2)year strategy in early 2018, it will likely concentrate not so
much on output growth as on cost(cid:2)cutting efforts. In particular, it wants to cut the period of well
construction, improve the productivity of well crews and drilling rig utilization (capex) and reduce
the cost of running a well by 10% (opex).
It is important to note that for Rosneft, as indeed for its peers in Russia, lifting costs and
maintenance capex are eclipsed by operating taxation. We have just discussed the effect that
differences in taxation can have on the profitability.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
9
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Why taxes are important in Russian energy, $/bbl
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
17.6
11.5
Operating taxes are almost
twice as high as all the other
cash costs combined.
4.7
1.5
4.9
4.3
Operating taxes
All other cash costs
Export duty
Transport costs
MET
SG&A
Lifting costs
Capex (maintenance)
Note: Average cost of an oil producer assuming crude oil export only, at a $50/bbl oil price. Tax
data is for 2018.
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Even halving the lifting costs – a Herculean effort – would add less than $1.2/bbl to Rosneft’s
profits. Reducing brownfield capex could add a bit more.
However, the track record is not that great in either area.
Rosneft’s per(cid:2)barrel lifting costs were historically low because the company acquired a prime asset,
Yuganskneftegaz, during the Yukos bankruptcy proceedings. However, costs in rubles have more
than doubled since 2012. While this is presumably attributable to its purchase of TNK(cid:2)BP’s lower(cid:2)
quality assets, it is notable that lifting costs have kept on rising even after the 2013 consolidation of
TNK(cid:2)BP, growing by almost 50% in the four years. Were it not for the depreciation of the ruble,
they would have been over $7/bbl today – not that far below its global peers’ $8(cid:2)13/bbl. (We refer
to the growth in ruble costs because almost all lifting and maintenance capex costs are in rubles.)
Rosneft’s lifting costs, R/bbl
250
200
150
100
50
0
Sechin era
TNK(cid:2)BP acquisition
Bogdanchikov era
6
0
0
2
7
0
0
2
8
0
0
2
9
0
0
2
0
1
0
2
1
1
0
2
2
1
0
2
3
1
0
2
4
1
0
2
5
1
0
2
6
1
0
2
E
7
1
0
2
Source: Company
Unit brownfield capex at first declined after the TNK(cid:2)BP acquisition because TNK(cid:2)BP’s investments
per barrel were lower. However, it has since risen by 70% – despite (or perhaps because of)
Rosneft’s much(cid:2)touted consolidation of some 60% of its drilling in(cid:2)house by 2016. The company
now fully controls a third of all the estimated rigs operating in Russia.
10
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
Rosneft’s brownfield capex, R/bbl
500
400
300
200
100
0
A decline here after TNK(cid:2)BP’s
acquisition because the target’s
brownfield unit capex was lower
than Rosneft’s.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Indeed, by now Rosneft’s combined cash costs of running its fields are pretty much in line with the
sector in general. Whatever lingering advantage the company has in lifting costs is wiped out by its
high brownfield capex.
Upstream brownfield cash costs, $/bbl, 2016
16.0
14.0
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
13.4
t
f
e
N
m
o
r
p
z
a
G
9.7
t
f
e
n
s
s
u
R
Rosneft’s brownfield cash costs are no
longer lower than the sector average.
9.0
9.0
8.9
8.4
7.7
6.0
t
f
e
n
t
a
T
z
a
g
e
t
f
e
n
t
u
g
r
u
S
l
i
o
k
u
L
t
f
e
n
s
o
R
t
f
e
n
h
s
a
B
m
a
e
r
t
s
p
U
l
*
g
v
a
d
e
i
f
n
w
o
r
b
Brownfield capex
Upstream opex
* simple average at six brownfield majors (ex(cid:2)Russneft) in 2016
Source: Companies; Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Rosneft has been touting its top(cid:2)down efficiency effort, complete with Stalinesque tales about employees
being confronted with charges of malfeasance at management meetings and marched straight into
police custody. The numbers tell a different story. But even without the numbers, the myth is becoming
harder to sustain. This May, Rosneft published a tender announcement on its website that was in the
spirit of the good old Gazprom. We reproduce parts of it below.
Purchasing tender by RN(cid:2)Aerocraft (Rosneft subsidiary)
Item
Caviar dish
Vodka shot glass
Whiskey shot glass
Cognac glass
Ice tongs
Napkin holder
Comforter blanket
Table cloth
Table napkin
Table fork
Table knife
Teaspoon
Table spoon
Cost per item, $
Total
Total cost, $
1,456
194
205
227
637
572
2,184
245
114
196
221
261
196
2
18
18
18
2
4
12
16
48
18
18
18
18
2,913
3,491
3,692
4,095
1,273
2,286
26,206
3,924
5,465
3,535
3,982
4,693
3,535
Note: RN(cid:2)Aerocraft provides air services for Rosneft’s upstream operations and for its
management. The tender was awarded to a single contractor and approved unanimously by the
purchasing committee on May 15, 2017. Rosneft withdrew it after it became public.
Source: Minutes of company purchasing tender number MTP(cid:2)9296/49(cid:2)05.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
11
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Wrong gas
Rosneft is also putting quite an emphasis on its gas business. It claims to be the second largest gas
producer in Russia, with 67 bcm of attributable output in 2016 (including its 49% stake in
Gazprom(cid:2)run Purgaz unit), versus Novatek’s 66 bcm. The management sees output growing by
circa 50% to 100 bcm by 2020, which would be equivalent to a quarter of Gazprom’s production
by then. Gas makes up more than 20% of Rosneft’s hydrocarbon production score when measured
on a barrel(cid:2)equivalent basis, and this should rise to 27% by 2020.
Gross gas output projections, bcm
99
89
67
70
79
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
63
57
38
16
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Rosneft
Novatek
Note: Including gross production of both natural and associated gas and attributable output of
associates.
Source: Companies, CDU TEK, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
However, these figures should be put in some context. Numbers sourced from MD&A suggest that
in 2016, Rosneft failed to sell more than 11 bcm of the gas that it produced. The production total
includes reinjections at Vankor and Chayvo, own use and volumes lost during the processing of
associated (petroleum) gas. Saleable gas production was only 49 bcm on a consolidated basis (ex(cid:2)
Purgaz), and Rosneft had to purchase almost 16 bcm to meet the obligations under the contracts it
had signed a few years earlier. In comparison, Novatek markets almost all the gas that it produces.
Rosneft’s consolidated gas balance in 2016, bcm
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
35
25
11
16
49
65
Natural gas
production
Associated
gas
production
Reinjections
and losses
Output of
saleable gas
Sales of gas
Purchases
(including
from
associates)
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
A more important caveat has to do with the economics of Rosneft’s gas. Apart from its crown jewel,
the Rospan unit (an inheritance of the TNK(cid:2)BP purchase), and some condensate output at Vankor,
almost all of Rosneft’s natural gas production consists of dry gas from the Cenomanian layers. Dry
gas, the market price of which is set in reference to the regulated tariffs on Gazprom, has become
much less profitable after the ruble’s depreciation in 2014(cid:2)15. On a barrels(cid:2)equivalent basis, it is
only a third as profitable as crude oil production. So adding it to the total hydrocarbon score may be
proper volumetric accounting but it is misleading economics.
12
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
Comparison of gas, condensate and crude oil economics,
$/boe, 2017
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
26
11
Condensate
Crude oil
4
Gas
Lifting costs
MET
Cost of condensate processing
Transport cost
Export duty (condensate and crude only)
EBITDA
Note: Assuming a $50/bbl oil price.
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
What has spared Novatek’s financials since the collapse of the ruble has, of course, been its
condensate business. Rosneft’s Rospan unit, which targets the wet Achimov layers, is one of the
most condensate(cid:2)rich prospects in Russia. Its output is targeted at more than 30% condensate
content, similar to SeverEnergia’s and outpaced only by the Jurassic layers at Novatek’s small
Terneftegaz JV with Total.
Liquids content in wet gas output
34%
30%
30%
9%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
s
a
g
e
t
f
e
n
r
e
T
)
c
i
s
s
a
r
u
J
(
n
a
p
s
o
R
*
)
v
o
m
h
c
A
(
i
s
a
g
c
i
t
c
r
A
d
n
a
v
o
m
h
c
A
(
i
i
i
)
n
a
n
g
n
a
a
V
l
s
a
g
t
r
o
N
i
i
)
n
a
n
g
n
a
a
V
(
l
5%
e
y
o
k
s
v
o
r
a
h
k
r
u
Y
,
k
e
t
a
v
o
N
(
y
c
a
g
e
l
i
i
)
n
a
n
g
n
a
a
V
l
* share of condensate and LPG, guided at peak production in 2023
Note: For other than Rospan, 2Q17 figures used.
Source: Rosneft, Novatek, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Alas, almost none of Rospan’s liquids will enjoy premium condensate economics. Rosneft decided
about two years ago that the volumes would be injected into Transneft’s crude oil pipeline and would
thus receive crude oil profits. The intention is to mix the condensate with the viscous crude oil
production from the Russkoye field, which would allow that field to come on stream in the first place.
But it also means, on our estimates, giving up almost $600 mln of annual operating profit at the peak.
So while Rosneft’s gross gas production may account for 27% of all the volumes by 2020, its share
in operating profits will be only about 11%, we estimate, up from 9% last year. In other words, it
will add less than $1 bln to EBITDA between now and then, or about a fifth of the total EBITDA
growth (the rest will come from the crude oil business and the downstream).
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
13
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Rosneft’s gas business EBITDA, $ bln
2.1
1.9
1.6
2.8
2.7
2.7
2.5
While growing by 60% by 2020, the
business will still contribute fairly
little to Rosneft’s overall financials.
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
2021E
2022E
Note: Excludes Rospan’s condensate production (because monetized as crude oil).
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Rosneft has shelved its LNG program and has been lobbying for access to pipeline gas exports. It
would like to ship 10 bcm of gas westwards toward Europe. Eventually, it also aims to supply about
8 bcm from the Lensky Cluster in East Siberia, concentrated around the Verchnechonsk and Taas(cid:2)
Yuryakh fields and situated right in the path of the future Power of Siberia pipeline to China.
Gazprom, which has a monopoly on pipeline exports from Russia, is resisting.
Pipeline exports, however, have lost much of their relevance to the economics of the gas sector
since the drop in global gas prices. We expect European spot prices to be capped at an average of
around $5/MMBtu ($180/mcm), and it’s unlikely that Rosneft will be able to sell gas at a premium.
Moreover, if Gazprom loses its export monopoly, it remains unclear why it should have to be the
only one to pay the special surcharge on MET, which has been in effect since 2016. Assuming
Rosneft can prevail upon the government to force Gazprom into shipping its competitor’s gas
abroad, but at the price of higher taxation, it would stand to earn only an additional $16/mcm for
shipments westward, we estimate. For the 10 bcm contract it has with BP, this would come to just
$160 mln accretion, or about 0.5% of its total EBITDA.
Comparison of gas sales profitability, $/mcm
Gazprom sales
to Europe
Rosneft domestic sales
(end customer)
Sales price
Export duty
Transport costs
MET paid
Production costs
EBITDA to wellhead
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
170
51
52
24
4
38
53
–
19
8
4
22
If Rosneft were to pay Gazprom’s rate
of MET on its exported gas, its gain
from sales to Europe would be about
$16/mcm – or about $160 mln on the
10 bcm contract with BP.
The company says it could eventually ship cheaper via the Nord Stream pipeline, but that remains to
be seen. As for the shipments eastward, the final cost of the Power of Siberia pipeline is likely to be
so high that were Gazprom to set an investment tariff on the route, Rosneft may be better off not
producing the Lensky Cluster gas at all. (We believe the China project is value(cid:2)destructive for
Gazprom, too, given the low price in its contracts.)
The third source of organic growth that Rosneft has outlined is the improvement in the refining
slate. However, over the past two years the company has significantly scaled back on what it
expects to deliver on that front, and has postponed the investment cycle by about three to four
years. We currently expect about a $2.5 bln uplift to EBITDA by 2023 from the addition of
hydrotreatment, hydrocracking and coking units at several of Rosneft’s refineries, the equivalent of
about a $3/bbl boost to the margin (Rosneft is guiding for a $5/bbl gain).
14
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
Rosneft’s guidance for refining upgrade
Light product yield: 60%
Light product yield: 67%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
2017
“After modernization”*
Gasoline
Diesel
Jet fuel
Fuel oil and other
* believed to be 2023.
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Rosneft’s guided plans as recently as 2015 had called for an expansion in throughput capacity by
about 5 mln tonnes at the legacy refineries; this has now been shelved. Curiously, however, the
capex estimate has only come down by 20%, with about R400 bln ($6.5 bln) remaining to be
invested over the next four years.
Evolution of Rosneft’s guidance on the downstream
Date of completion
Increase in legacy throughput, mln tonnes
Increase in share of light product yield
Upgrade capex, R bln
Rosneft
guidance
2015
2019
4.6
12%
726
Rosneft
guidance
2017
None given*
None
10%
575
* company informally guides that upgrades will be completed by 2023
Source: Company
The broader downstream sector, we believe, presents a threat, not an opportunity, for Rosneft
shareholders. The company will aim to bring the share of petrochemicals in its capacity to 20% by 2022(cid:2)
25. This suggests that the construction of the expanded 30 mln tonne Far East Petrochemical Plant
(FEPCO) may indeed proceed at some point. Rosneft plans to invest $30 bln into petrochemicals by 2025.
FEPCO planned input and output
LPG
6%
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Naphtha
94%
Pyrolysis resin
14%
Benzene
10%
Polypropylene
27%
$140/tonne in
processing costs
Monoethylene
glycol
24%
Polyethylene
25%
We discussed Rosneft’s petrochemicals ambitions in some depth in our April 2012 report on the
company. Not much has changed since then. The idea has always been to take advantage of the
high export duties and therefore lower domestic prices on naphtha (straight(cid:2)run gasoline), the
feedstock product. But even a more reasonable 3.5 mln tonne petchem unit, assuming just $5 bln in
capex, fails to deliver a double(cid:2)digit return, on our estimates.
The Economy Ministry came to the same conclusion this June, adding that the project would also require
at least $2 bln of state funding for the infrastructure. Meanwhile, Rosneft’s idea to first build an $11 bln,
12 mln tonne refinery in the Far East in order to supply the naphtha for the petchem plant is surely a joke.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
15
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
The only saving grace would be if an outside partner takes control of the project and carries the risks.
Rosneft and ChemChina signed a framework agreement in September 2016 to set up a JV, but Rosneft
would hold a 60% stake and the financing would be proportional. This is not good enough and would fall
far short of the best practices in financial engineering and de(cid:2)risking set by Novatek with its LNG projects.
How to read Rosneft’s financials
We expect the three sources of growth (ex(cid:2)petchem) to contribute $4(cid:2)5 bln in EBITDA gains to Rosneft
over the next five years, assuming a flat $50/bbl oil price. Depending on how it is counted, this amounts
to a 20% or a 30% boost to this year’s operating earnings. The difference has to do with the confusing
way in which Rosneft prepares its financials. We must touch upon this before we proceed.
Gain to Rosneft’s adjusted EBITDA by sector, 2017(cid:2)23, $ bln
2.5
Total:
$4.7 bln
1.3
0.9
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Crude oil
Gas
Refining
Over 2013(cid:2)15, Rosneft received about $45 bln in prepayments on future crude oil supplies: from
BP, Trafigura, Glencore, Vitol and, most importantly, from CNPC. Some $29 bln of these
prepayments were advanced when the ruble was hovering around USD/RUB 30(cid:2)35. The
prepayments are effectively dollar(cid:2)denominated debt, because Rosneft has to supply enough crude
oil volumes to honor the repayment schedule, whatever the oil price may be.
Prepayments received by Rosneft, 2013(cid:2)15 (total: $45 bln)
16
Reimbursements only on this one,
received after the ruble had
depreciated, will fully come through
in revenues once the deliveries start
around 2019.
Source: Company
12
10
2
5
Glencore, Vitol, Trafigura (2013)
BP (2014)
First tranche from CNPC (2013)
Second tranche from CNPC (2014)
Third tranche from CNPC (2015)
After the ruble had depreciated (to just under USD/RUB 40) at the end of 3Q14, Rosneft booked a
R95 bln ($2.6 bln) forex loss, bringing its net income for the quarter down to zero. As a consequence,
Rosneft’s chief accountant was let go. The new accountants, apparently with the consent of the
external auditor Ernst and Young, made two choices that helped Rosneft stabilize its net income as the
ruble entered free fall by 4Q14. The first was to “freeze” the prepayments on the balance sheet in
rubles, using the old exchange rate; the second was, essentially, to amortize the forex loss on the
conventional debt over a five(cid:2)year span.
The flip side of these choices was to make Rosneft’s financial statements more difficult to decipher,
and even somewhat misleading, requiring the following adjustments:
16
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
█ Net debt. The company claims its net debt was $37.5 bln at end 2Q17. This sum excludes all the
prepayments. If the prepayments are added using the reported balance sheet and the current
exchange rate, the net debt would seem to be $67 bln, also an underestimate. The true net debt
– treating some $35 bln of the remaining prepayments at their actual dollar value – is $73 bln.
The cash balance includes almost $8 bln of funds moved by the accountants to the “long(cid:2)term
investments” line from 4Q16 onwards. It is unclear how liquid this sum actually is, which means
that the actual net debt could be higher than $73 bln. In comparison, net debt stood at $64.5 bln
at end 1Q13, after Rosneft had incorporated TNK(cid:2)BP.
What is Rosneft’s net debt? It depends…. ($ bln)
We think it’s one of these two.
$81 bln
$67 bln
$73 bln
100
80
60
40
20
0
$37.5 bln
As reported by the
company
Including
prepayments
listed on balance
sheet
Including the real
dollar value of
prepayments
Excluding funds
moved to “long(cid:2)
term investments”
at end 2016
Note: All numbers as of end 2Q17.
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
█ P&L items. Oil supplied under the earlier prepayment agreements is accrued as revenue at the old
(weaker ruble) exchange rate, too. On an accrual basis, this understates the value of the delivered
oil, introducing a forex loss right into the top line. For instance, this year is the peak of deliveries
under the prepayments as reimbursement under the first two China tranches kicks in. However, out
of about $7.5 bln in deliveries, only about $4.5 bln will come through in revenues. By next year, the
ratio should become roughly equal, and from 2019 onwards the company will be repaying $3.5 bln
per year, of which about two thirds will come through to revenues – a portion of reimbursements of
earlier prepayments made at the old exchange rate, and roughly the entirety of the last one.
Schedule of delivery of prepaid oil, $ bln
8
6
4
2
0
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
In revenues
Excluded from P&L
Note: Assumes no rollover of prepayments.
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Given all the junk found below the operating line of Russian energy companies, as well as unusually low
depreciation expense, investors have historically singled out EBITDA, a non(cid:2)GAAP measure, as their
preferred P&L indicator. If you treat prepayments as debt, as we do, and if EBITDA is used as a rough
measure of pre(cid:2)tax sustainable operating cash flows, then the part of the deliveries that does not appear
in revenues (circa $3.2 bln in 2017) should be added back. The company’s adjusted EBITDA in 2017E
would therefore come to about $23.5 bln, and its net debt(cid:2)to(cid:2)EBITDA ratio would be just over 3.0.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
17
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Rosneft’s EBITDA measures, $ bln
29
27
25
23
21
19
17
15
The difference is the deliveries excluded
from revenues (see previous chart) and
should drop from $3.2 bln this year to
$1.3 bln by 2019.
5
1
0
2
6
1
0
2
E
7
1
0
2
E
8
1
0
2
E
9
1
0
2
E
0
2
0
2
E
1
2
0
2
E
2
2
0
2
E
3
2
0
2
E
4
2
0
2
E
5
2
0
2
P&L(cid:2)derived EBITDA
Adjusted EBITDA*
* adjusted for the value of deliveries under prepayment agreements not included in the top line
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
The difference in the two measures of about $3.2 bln this year should drop to $1.3 bln by 2019,
when some earlier prepayments will have been repaid and the most recent one will kick in.
Meanwhile, the “amortized” forex loss of about $2.2 bln per year should also go away by 2019,
giving a major combined boost of over $3 bln (post tax) to Rosneft’s net income – in theory. This
would go a long way toward more than doubling our projected net income to $10 bln by 2020,
therefore doubling the dividend too, to an almost 9% yield to the current share price.
Composition of Rosneft’s net income growth to 2020
29%
31%
Total:
$6.2 bln
Gains in operating earnings*
Gains in associates’ income, lower net
interest costs, etc.
Greater repayments (smaller forex loss)
in the top line
25%
15%
Expiration of 2014 forex loss
depreciation
More than half of the gains in
net income (and therefore in
the dividend) that we expect
by 2020 are the result of
accounting changes, not gains
in operating earnings.
Note: Assuming a flat oil price of $50/bbl.
* ex(cid:2)minority interest and growth in depreciation
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
But will this happen in practice? A company that has “managed” its P&L so extensively thus far may
continue to do so in the future, even if no obvious means for that are yet apparent. We discuss that
later in this report.
█ Free cash flow. The same thinking holds for the estimate of the company’s free cash flow. Because
Rosneft does not treat prepayments as debt but simply as deliveries already paid for, it excludes the
full dollar price of the delivered oil from its operating cash flow. (Were prepayments treated as debt,
their dollar value would be restored to the operating cash flow and then removed from financing
cash flow – kind of an accrual accounting trick, but a more fair representation of what is really going
on.) Adjusting for this gives the “real” value of free cash flow. However, we do treat prepayments to
PDVSA ($2.5 bln over 2016(cid:2)1H17) as a reduction from operating cash flow because these are
credits advanced to a CCC(cid:2)rated entity.
18
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
Adjusting Rosneft’s free cash flow, $ bln, 2016
10
8
6
4
2
0
(2)
This sum should be added back to
the operating cash flow depending
on how convinced you are that
Rosneft will get repaid.
9.4
(10.7)
3.0
1.5
4.3
Operating
cash flow in
financial
statements
Capex
Deliveries
under
prepayments*
Actual free
cash flow
Prepayment to
Venezuela
* and other trading adjustments
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Faith(cid:2)based forecasting
There are more tricks lurking in Rosneft’s financial statements. For instance, the company treats the
interest that it pays on the conventional debt ($2.6 bln last year) as financing cash flow, while the
interest it receives on cash as operating cash flow.
But putting that aside, we see free cash flow – adjusted to add back prepayments – expanding from
about $5(cid:2)6 bln this year to nearly $12 bln by 2020 and $14 bln at the peak in 2022. After servicing
prepayments and other debt, this should allow the company to comfortably cover its dividend,
which at the recently raised 50% payout level should more than double to about $5 bln by 2020 (a
nearly 9% yield). As we’ve seen, more than half of the expansion in the bottom line will be due to
the expiration of artificially created accounting issues.
Rosneft’s free cash flow should comfortably cover the
rising dividend, $ bln
10
8
6
4
2
0
(2)
(4)
(6)
2017E
2018E
2019E
2020E
2021E
2022E
2023E
Dividend at 50% payout
FCF after debt servicing*
* FCF after the reimbursements of prepayments and net interest expense
Note: Dividend expressed for the period in which it is paid.
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Assuming no more acquisitions or other calls on its cash, Rosneft could start deleveraging by next
year. Its net debt(cid:2)to(cid:2)adjusted EBITDA ratio could fall to just 1.0 by 2023.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
19
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Rosneft’s net debt is expected to drop – on paper, $ bln
80
60
40
20
0
For this divergence to happen,
management thinking needs to shift.
We’ll discuss this point further.
Debt at 1x adjusted
EBITDA by 2023?
3
1
0
2
4
1
0
2
5
1
0
2
6
1
0
2
E
7
1
0
2
E
8
1
0
2
E
9
1
0
2
E
0
2
0
2
E
1
2
0
2
E
2
2
0
2
E
3
2
0
2
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Importantly, however, this assumes a reduction of capital expenditures on the current assets by over
$4 bln. There is no way around it. If we want to arrive at a fair value that’s anywhere near the
current share price, we must assume a decline in capex in the future. Rosneft’s debt burden is so
high that even as much as $10 bln per year in terminal free cash flow, discounted by 10%, would
leave less than $30 bln in value to equity at this time, or half the current market cap.
Sources for the decline in Rosneft’s capex, 2022E vs
2017E, $ bln
16.0
15.0
14.0
13.0
12.0
11.0
10.0
15.5
x
e
p
a
c
E
7
1
0
2
1.5
1.2
0.5
0.9
n
i
e
n
i
l
c
e
D
n
i
s
t
n
e
m
t
s
e
v
n
i
l
s
d
e
i
f
n
e
e
r
g
w
e
n
n
i
e
n
i
l
c
e
D
z
a
g
e
t
f
e
n
k
s
n
a
g
u
Y
x
e
p
a
c
r
e
h
t
o
n
i
e
n
i
l
c
e
D
s
a
g
n
i
e
n
i
l
c
e
D
y
l
i
r
a
m
i
r
p
(
x
e
p
a
c
)
n
a
p
s
o
R
l
*
x
e
p
a
c
d
e
i
f
n
w
o
r
b
0.3
m
a
e
r
t
s
n
w
o
d
s
t
n
e
m
t
s
e
v
n
i
11.0
x
e
p
a
c
E
2
2
0
2
n
i
e
n
i
l
c
e
D
* mostly Uvat and Verkhnechonsk
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
As it happens, though, Rosneft has cut capex in real (ruble) terms only once, by 5% in 2014, the
year it was placed under US and European sanctions and the future of its financing was rather
uncertain. (That year, however, Rosneft still managed to lend $4 bln to Venezuela, and we do not
expect repayment.) As we have seen, brownfield maintenance capex has been rising, and so our
assumptions that Yuganskneftegaz would see a massive drop in capex after this year’s ramp(cid:2)up are
probably too optimistic.
20
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
Rosneft’s capital expenditures, R bln
900
800
700
600
500
400
How likely is this? After a jump this
year, we assume that capex will
gradually decline back toward the
2016 level. However, a decline in
capex happened only once (in 2014)
and was “compensated” for by a $4
bln loan to Venezuela.
2
1
0
2
3
1
0
2
4
1
0
2
5
1
0
2
6
1
0
2
E
7
1
0
2
E
8
1
0
2
E
9
1
0
2
E
0
2
0
2
E
1
2
0
2
E
2
2
0
2
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
This brings us to the crucial part of our discussion. Why has Rosneft not been able to reduce its net
debt so far and what does that say about the relevance of our financial projections?
All over the canvas
“‘Every good deal, every masterpiece, requires some effort,’
Sechin says of the Essar acquisition. When challenged on
whether the debt(cid:2)laden [Rosneft] bears comparison to a
Michelangelo, he replies: ‘It is more like an Henri Matisse.’”
Interview with Financial Times, June 2017
Rosneft’s CEO does not welcome publicity. As a result, there are few resources that delve deeply into his
way of thinking. The better ones available, all in Russian, tend to reach two conclusions, which are always
substantially based on talking to unnamed sources. The first is that Sechin believes in consolidation of
capital under state control. For instance, the expansion of InterRAO UES, where he is the chairman of the
board and CEO, is seen as an intentional reversal of the breakup of RAO UES over 2006(cid:2)08.
The second conclusion put forward by publicly available studies of Sechin is that he has trouble either
grasping or appreciating economic principles. However, it is difficult to find much in his public statements
that would support this. His 1998 dissertation on investments in energy transport systems has been
quoted as praising the Soviet nuclear and space programs for delivering results “at any cost.” But the
actual text does not so much laud such an approach as argues that profit(cid:2)minded project management is
a new notion to Russia. The dissertation – assuming Sechin actually wrote it himself – shows a firm grasp
of basic concepts like the time value of money, net present value, rate of return and payback period.
Deeds would be a better illustration of Sechin’s thinking than words. While certainly hinting at a statist
approach, his deeds suggest a more prosaic yearning, common to many CEOs, for quick expansion
using someone else’s money (be that of shareholders or borrowed funds).
Below is the list of Rosneft’s major acquisitions since 2011. There is no apparent common trend
here, except perhaps towards vertical integration (OFS business, refining, retail). The disjointed
assets coerced into cohabitation and lack of a unifying perspective – this is no work of Matisse.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
21
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Rosneft’s acquisitions, 2011(cid:2)17E
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
Asset
Essar Oil (49% stake)
Zohr
Bashneft minorities buyout
Kondaneft
LLC Drilling Service Technology
Other
Bashneft (50.07% stake from government)
Targin
Leasing company
Other
Schwedt refinery (16.7% stake)
Novokuibyshevsk Petchem Co
Trican Well Service
Petrol Market
Other
TNK(cid:2)BP minorities buyout
Weatherford’s Russia+Venezuela business
Orenburg Drilling Company
Petrocas
Bishkek Oil Company
TNK(cid:2)BP International (cash)
TNK(cid:2)BP International (shares to BP)
TNK(cid:2)BP International (debt assumed)
Taas(cid:2)Yuryakh (additional 65% stake)
ITERA (additional 49% stake)
Arctic Russia B.V. (SeverEnergia) (40% stake)
Saras (13.7%+7.29% stakes)*
TNK(cid:2)Sheremetyevo
Other
Vnukovo fueling (50% stake)
Taas(cid:2)Yuryakh (35% stake)
ITERA (51% stake)
Research and Development Center LLC
Arcticshelfneftegaz (50% stake)
Polar Terminal LLC
Other
Kind
Refining (India)
Gas (offshore Egypt)
VIOC (Russia)
Upstream (Russia)
OFS (Russia)
Unknown
VIOC (Russia)
OFS (Russia)
Real estate (Russia)
Unknown
Refining (Germany)
Petrochemicals (Russia)
OFS (Russia)
Petrol stations (Armenia)
Unknown
VIOC (Russia)
OFS (Russia and Venezuela)
OFS (Russia)
Petrol stations (Georgia)
Petrol stations (Kyrgyzstan)
VIOC (Russia)
VIOC (Russia)
VIOC (Russia)
Upstream (Russia)
Gas (Russia)
Gas (Russia)
Refining (Italy)
Jet fueling (Russia)
Unknown
Jet fueling (Russia)
Upstream (Russia)
Gas (Russia)
R&D (Russia)
Upstream (Russia)
Shipping (Russia)
Unknown
Ruhr Oel (50% stake acquired from PdVSA)
Other
Refining (Germany)
Unknown
Total 2011(cid:2)17 (gross of disposals)
Total 2011(cid:2)17 (net of disposals)**
Total ex(cid:2)TNK(cid:2)BP
* Saras has since been disposed of at roughly the same price as purchased
** disposals mostly consist of a 2014 sale of a 49% stake in a petrochemicals unit to Sibur for $1.6 bln
Note: Excludes investments in Venezuela (mostly loans and prepayments) and E&P license purchases.
Source: Company
$ mln
3,700
2,075
828
699
157
271
5,233
65
40
474
353
300
150
40
459
4,825
500
247
144
39
44,380
10,557
1,802
3,139
3,002
1,799
358
300
372
515
431
219
133
99
32
101
1,960
438
90,238
88,002
28,674
It is often observed that Rosneft under Sechin aims to be a major global integrated player like Exxon.
For instance, Rosneft’s 2013 annual report touted the emergence of a “Global Energy Company.” If
that really is the strategy, then you should sell the shares now, because once this becomes apparent,
nobody will pay the current double(cid:2)digit P/Es for a bunch of disjointed assets scattered around the
world and run out of Moscow by a political appointee. (Even running Russian assets like that is hard
enough to sell to the market). Then again, maybe you did sell them back in 2013 and are glad you did.
The assumption behind the entire forward(cid:2)looking financial discussion thus far is that global expansion
would not be Rosneft’s strategy.
22
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
But is it art? Rosneft’s acquisitions by kind, 2011(cid:2)17E, $
bln (ex(cid:2)TNK(cid:2)BP)
Note the proliferation of colors and
the disregard for natural focus.
2%1% 6%
3%
23%
6%
9%
13%
Venezuela (loans and acquisitions)
Oil upstream (Russia)
Refining (abroad)
Gas (Russia)
Refining and petrochemicals (Russia)
Gas (abroad)
OFS (Russia and abroad)
20%
Jet fuelling (Russia)
Retail (abroad)
Other or unknown
17%
Note: Bashneft acquisition treated as 50/50 upstream oil/refining.
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
What is the track record of Rosneft’s acquisition activity? Let’s look at some of the recent purchases.
█ We have estimated that Rosneft has agreed to pay at least twice as much as Essar Oil is worth (see
the detailed discussion in our note “Rosneft: Hindi Russi Bhai Bhai,” October 2016). We believe the
company may have also agreed to ultimately backstop the other partners, UCP and Trafigura, on
their own 49% stake.
█ Rosneft’s purchase of the stake in Zohr from Eni valued the project at $5.3 bln, in line with WoodMac’s
net present value estimates – but these assume the full production of 25 bcm per year at the peak
starting as soon as 2020, for a field discovered less than two years ago. In other words, Rosneft paid
the full best(cid:2)case value for this asset, thus fully de(cid:2)risking Eni on this stake with no upside to itself.
█ We have already discussed the risks associated with Kondaneft production, and the likely
overvaluation of that asset.
█ Even Bashneft cost the company over $1 bln more than our fair value indicated at the time.
Rosneft’s biggest acquisition, TNK(cid:2)BP, was of course acquired at peak oil prices for a combined $61.5
bln, comparable to Rosneft’s entire market cap today. We discussed Russian oil companies’ poor record
of timing their capital allocations in some depth in our August 2015 report, “Time Torn Off Unused”.
This is not a stellar record. On the other hand, Rosneft’s sales of large minority stakes in the Russian
upstream projects have come at decent enough valuations. We estimate the assumed oil price
implicit in these deals has been $60(cid:2)70/bbl.
Rosneft’s Russian upstream disposals, 2015(cid:2)17, $ bln
Completed
Asset
Stake sold
Buyers
Price, $ bln
Output, kbpd
May(cid:2)October 2016
June 2017
June 2015(cid:2)October 2016
Total
Vankor
Verkhnechonsk
Taas(cid:2)Yuryakh
49.9%
20.0%
49.9%
ONGC, other Indian firms
Beijing Enterprises Group
BP, Indian consortium
Note: Excludes the small Polar Lights stake sale ($98 mln).
Source: Company, press reports, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
2016
2020E
415
174
22
333
159
112
4,226
1,100
1,870
7,196
kbpd of output growth/
(decline) disposed of
(41)
(3)
45
1
Nevertheless, we find it hard to grasp the logic of these sales, even as an exercise to raise money.
The disposals have collectively funded this year’s acquisitions. However, they have all come from the
Russian oil upstream, where Rosneft enjoys a comparative advantage versus international peers
(though as we’ve seen, not anymore against Russian companies). The acquisitions, on the other
hand, have been literally all over the place.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
23
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Unfocused: Rosneft’s upstream disposals have funded this year’s acquisitions
Disposals, 2015(cid:2)17
Acquisitions, 2017 YTD
Total:
$7.2 bln
Russian upstream
100%
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
2% 3%
9%
Total:
$7.7 bln
48%
11%
27%
Refining (India)
Gas (offshore Egypt)
Integrated producer (Russia)
Upstream (Russia)
OFS (Russia)
Unknown
“For the benefit of Russia”
Can we identify what future acquisitions Rosneft might make?
The Borat(cid:2)sounding title of Rosneft’s latest annual report, “For the benefit of Russia,” suggests that
the main priority going forward will not be the pursuit of shareholder value, either. The priority
remains the pursuit of some abstract national benefit. The way the management has identified this
is consolidation of capital under state ownership. While this does not necessarily imply accumulating
assets “at any price,” the general tangent is towards non(cid:2)organic growth.
A popular Russian parlor game is to predict whom among its peers Rosneft might gobble up next. In the
upstream, we see only a handful of potential purchases of any material size. None of these is likely to be
cheap, unless the assets happen to be acquired in a bankruptcy auction, similar to Yuganskneftegaz back
in December 2004 (even that ended up costing Rosneft almost $10 bln). Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz,
Russneft, fast(cid:2)growing Irkutsk Oil Company and heavily indebted Independent Petroleum Company
(NNK) are the only remaining private majors in the country.
Russian producers by liquids output, September 2017, mln bpd
4.2
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
1.6
1.2
0.8
0.6
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
l
i
o
k
u
L
*
t
f
e
n
s
o
R
z
a
g
e
t
f
e
n
t
u
g
r
u
S
t
f
e
N
m
o
r
p
z
a
G
t
f
e
n
t
a
T
*
*
t
f
e
n
v
a
S
l
d
n
a
t
f
e
n
s
s
u
R
*
*
*
a
s
i
t
f
e
N
l
i
O
k
s
t
u
k
r
I
y
n
a
p
m
o
C
k
e
t
a
v
o
N
0.0
K
N
N
Note: Green denotes state(cid:2)owned, orange denotes privately(cid:2)owned. Production given on a
consolidated basis per CDU TEK methodology (not attributable).
* including Bashneft
** about 50/50 owned by Rosneft and Gazprom Neft
*** Russneft and Neftisa have common shareholders
Source: CDU TEK, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
We will refrain from commenting on the chances of Rosneft’s acquiring the first four, except to note that
the often(cid:2)heard perception that Surgutneftegaz’s $42 bln in cash is just sitting there waiting for Rosneft
to scoop it up appears naive to us. Rosneft would likely pay the fair value or more for the operating assets
of the politically(cid:2)protected company, and Surgutneftegaz’s cash would have been gone by then.
24
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
Rosneft already attempted to wrest control over Russneft in 2005(cid:2)07, according to discussions in
the Russian press. As for NNK, the company has widely been seen as a vehicle for acquiring assets
on behalf of Rosneft. We estimate its current debt load (including the debt of its major subsidiary
Alliance Oil) at around $5 bln, while the assets it has managed to consolidate, including the
upstream and the Khabarovsk refinery, are of poor quality. The Kondaneft transaction could be an
indication that Rosneft is willing to overpay for NNK’s assets to bail out the group – hence, it will be
important to watch that acquisition’s production curve.
If Rosneft is set on continuing the strategy of empire(cid:2)building, and fails to clinch major Russian assets
like Lukoil or Surgutneftegaz, its heft will keep on pushing it both out of its sector and out of Russia.
Some of the projects that have been announced by the company – which may also point to its M&A
strategy in the future – include:
█ FEPCO, the major refining and petrochemicals complex in the Russian Far East (see the discussion
above).
█ The 15 mln tonne Tuban refining and petrochemicals complex in northeast Java in Indonesia
(Indonesian company Pertamina may in turn get a stake in the Russkoye field).
█ A 30 bcm gas pipeline from Kurdistan to Turkey. Rosneft has no comparative advantage here and
given the upstream issues in Kurdistan, the pipeline may remain well below capacity for years.
This is not to mention the political problems that have become more apparent in recent days.
Turkey, which is fighting a decades(cid:2)long war against Kurdish separatists, may shut down the
pipeline in the future.
█ Zvezda shipbuilding complex and the related Eastern Mining and Metallurgical Company to supply the
steel sheets for the dock yard (“the project … stimulates development of related industries and is a key
driver of the development of the region,” was the way Rosneft’s then(cid:2)chairman justified the project, to
shareholders, in the 2016 annual report). The shipyard is a JV between Rosneft, Gazprombank and
Rosneft’s parent holding Rosneftegaz. Thankfully for Rosneft’s shareholders, most of the costs of
setting up the plant are borne by Rosneftegaz, with Rosneft contributing “only” $2.5 bln, according to
Sechin. However, Rosneft will be the major buyer of vessels and may in that sense “backstop” Zvezda’s
future operations.
The latter project is also a testament to the Rosneft CEO’s apparent ideology of consolidating corporate
control along the whole value chain. One example is the ongoing collection of oil field services assets;
another is the setting up of what is effectively a Rosneft(cid:2)controlled JV for the production of helicopters
(which are used extensively in Russian oil production for the many assets that cannot be reached by
road). Zvezda is also part and parcel with Rosneft’s ambitions to develop the offshore Arctic, an
expensive undertaking that could become the dominant theme in the future; we discuss it in this
report’s section on the Arctic.
While we cannot assess the valuation of possible future deals or major investments not yet
announced, Rosneft faces a key handicap: its higher cost of equity compared with global majors
such as Exxon or BP implies that it will always overpay for any assets that were also available for
purchase to its Western competitors.
Ironically, acquisitions in places that Western majors cannot access – say, for argument’s sake, Iran –
could end up being more value(cid:2)accretive, as they would in theory allow Rosneft to drive a harder
bargain. In practice, however, something like the opposite of this has happened in Venezuela, where
Rosneft’s behavior resembles that of a hapless investor who keeps doubling down on his original
position in a company headed for bankruptcy. If the Maduro government holds, Rosneft is likely to
continue to be a net donor to the country. If it collapses, Rosneft could lose all of its assets there.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
25
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
How Rosneft got bogged down in Venezuela, $ bln
9.0
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
:
0
1
0
2
Rosneft says the total value of
outstanding loans to Venezuela is $6
bln, and that over $1 bln of interest and
principal has already been repaid.
However, the repayment is not possible
to isolate and trace in its financials.
1.5
0.1
0.5
4.0
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Note: NOC stands for National Oil Consortium Ltd., a joint venture with PdVSA developing Junin(cid:2)6 block.
Source: Company
The problem of induction
Just because Rosneft has acted in a certain way so far does not mean it will keep on doing so. For
instance, Lukoil’s capital allocation has improved significantly in recent years.
Lukoil’s net acquisitions/(disposals), $ bln
“Three years ago I was in
Washington and met the
gentleman in charge of the
US sanctions department.
That was at the beginning of
the events related to
Ukraine. And he said: ‘If
Russia does this and that,
then we will do that and
this’. And so I told him: ‘My
country is never going to
leave you unemployed.’”
(cid:2) Vagit Alekperov, Financial
Times, October 2017
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
(1.0)
(2.0)
5.4
It’s not clear that sanctions, introduced in
2014, were alone responsible for Lukoil’s
change in capital allocation policy, but they
certainly coincided with it.
3.4
2.9
2.6
1.7
1.6
1.5
0.9
1.1
1.2
0.5
0.2
$22 bln of net acquisitions made in the decade to
2013, the same amount that Rosneft has spent over
the past five years (excluding TNK(cid:2)BP purchase).
Disposals of a diamond mine,
upstream assets in Kazakhstan,
petrochemicals plant in Ukraine
and petrol stations in Eastern
Europe.
0.0
(0.0)
(1.2)
(1.4)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 1H17
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Much of the sell side has a BUY recommendation on Rosneft. Implicitly, these analysts seek to avoid
falling into the induction trap. However, it would seem they need to show why the company’s
behavior should undergo a transformation.
In Lukoil’s case, the management sobered up when sanctions were placed on Russia, which
coincided with the drop in the oil price. Sanctions and the falling oil price have hit Rosneft even
harder, but its management has not drawn similar lessons.
One possibility is that a new shareholder would exercise more oversight over management decisions.
But CEFC China Energy, which bought a 14% stake in Rosneft from the Qatar Investment Authority(cid:2)
led consortium early this year and which has received a substantial loan from VTB to fund this
acquisition, is unlikely to be such a shareholder. It is a notoriously nontransparent entity and is
reported to be connected to the political elites in China. Fortune magazine has reported that it recruits
from the government and military structures and awards “exemplary Party member” prizes to its
26
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
employees. It does not sound like the type of shareholder that would rock the boat. CEFC’s executive
director, Ye Jianming, has said he sees the role of corporations as helping to redistribute national
assets across society – a way of thinking not incongruent with Sechin’s.
BP, a 19.75% Rosneft shareholder since 2013, has also shown no success – or perhaps even desire –
in restraining Rosneft’s expansion. Because Rosneft does not disclose the way individual board
members have voted on major deals, all we can say is that BP’s representatives on the board have
either gone ahead with the management’s proposals or have failed to persuade other board members
to vote against them.
If Rosneft is unlikely to reform internally, could external events pressure it into changing its course? The
possibility cannot be rejected outright. However, if the combined effect of the drastic fall in the oil price
and Western sanctions has not helped improve its capital allocation, it is unclear what would.
If we’re right in our thesis that one person directs essentially all of Rosneft’s strategy, then analysts
and investors who argue that Rosneft is about to change its course must therefore assume either
that Rosneft’s CEO will deliberately come to a different set of values or that he will move on from his
role in the company. Either one seems a leap of faith to us. So while we’re indeed using inductive
reasoning and cannot in any sense “prove” our case that Rosneft will continue a non(cid:2)organic,
expansionist policy, the bullish view on Rosneft as churning loads of free cash flow in the future and
sharing it with investors is even less justified.
Impersonal exchange
Investors who subscribe to a skeptical view on Rosneft no longer have to worry about its weight in the
MSCI Index, either. Back in August 2015, we warned that the index was giving the company too much
weight relative to the dollar value of its free float (see “Rosneft: A Phantasmagoria for the Shorts,” August
2015). That made it risky to be underweight the stock in case of a general market rally. This scenario
indeed played out the following year, when Rosneft outpaced the RTS Index by almost 80%.
Weight in MSCI Russia indices
13%
13%
9%
9%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
6%
6%
5%
4%
4%
4%
m
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p
z
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3%
1%
t
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s
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p
2%
2%
2%
2%
s
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s
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r
p
MSCI Russia
MSCI Russia 10(cid:2)40
Source: MSCI, Bloomberg
However, that situation has now self(cid:2)corrected. Rosneft is no longer a company with a $3 bln free
float: it is now over $5 bln, closer to its share in the main indexes.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
27
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Free float of energy stocks
Transneft prefs $1.4 bln
Surgut commons $2.6 bln
Tatneft $2.8 bln
Surgut prefs $3.4 bln
Rosneft $5.1 bln
Novatek $8.4 bln
Lukoil $18.3 bln
Gazprom $18.8 bln
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
That means that for every dollar of inflows into indexed or quasi(cid:2)indexed funds, Rosneft will still get
a bigger share than Gazprom or Lukoil, but not that much bigger. That distinction now goes to
Tatneft and, as far as the 10(cid:2)40 index is concerned, to Transneft.
Additional bid as % of free float per each $1 bln of inflows
1.9%
1.3%
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
0.9%
0.8%
0.6%
0.6%
0.6%
0.6%
t
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t
a
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s
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t
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s
f
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p
Note: Based on mixed flows into funds tracking MSCI Russia/EM (circa 40%) and MSCI Russia
10(cid:2)40 (circa 60%), per the current following. Assumes indexed funds invest with no deviation
from the index (true for passive funds, not always so for actively(cid:2)managed money).
Source: MSCI, Bloomberg, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Rosneft stock still has higher volatility relative to the market (beta). But this stems from the company’s
leverage, not from bids or offers coming from indexed funds. The shares may outpace the rest of the
market when the oil price rises, and vice versa, but at least that is no longer amplified by outsized
trading from indexed accounts.
28
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
Beta over RTS
1.35
1.16 1.11
1.02
0.96 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.89
0.77 0.77
0.63
1.50
1.25
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
t
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s
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m
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t
f
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n
h
s
a
B
Note: Based on 30(cid:2)day excess volatility over a one(cid:2)year period.
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
The only remaining reason not to recommend that investors stay underweight Rosneft stock is that the
bullish forecasts might prove fully or partially right. Our financial projections, after all, are not that far
from the consensus; the only difference is that we don’t entirely believe them. But what if the company
really does take a long pause on acquisitions, addresses its swelling costs and reduces debt?
In fact, what if it simply allows the accounting adjustments that bring down the net income to lapse,
without otherwise changing the rest of the strategy? Given that Rosneft will never be taken over or
face the prospect of bankruptcy, would investors really care about the shrinking value remaining to
equity when they stand to get a 9% dividend yield in a couple of years’ time?
Because Rosneft has tinkered with its P&L thus far (see discussion above), our level of conviction
even on this one aspect is not very strong. Whether it pays up or not depends to a large extent on
whether its management will want to. That, in turn, will largely depend on whether the government
is successful in getting the holding company Rosneftegaz to share the dividends it receives from
Rosneft: if it is successful, the incentive to pay would be reduced.
And even if Rosneft does pay up, it could not finance the $5 bln annual dividend with leverage
indefinitely. Sooner or later, the market would discount this. Rosneft’s CFO has said publicly that the
company is comfortable with its current debt load. Its in(cid:2)house target for conventional debt is
roughly twice as high as where it is right now, implying that the management is open to piling on
more debt as prepayments are reduced. This would suggest that any future free cash flow beyond
the dividend will be reinvested. We have already examined the investment track record.
To take a neutral, much less a bullish, stance on Rosneft would require lots of things going right,
first and foremost, inside one person’s head. We are not prepared to believe in that quite yet.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
29
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
China Gas Imports: The Phantom Pipeline
We are going to discuss something here that may or may not exist. It is a project – the fourth link of the
Central Asia(cid:2)China Gas Pipeline, known as “Line D” – that some claim to have seen being constructed.
Yet others deny it, and we could find no evidence, thus far, that it is anything but a desert mirage.
Those who must have seen it are the presidents of China and Tajikistan – they presided over the
ceremony marking the start of its construction back in September 2014. Three years later, however,
there has been no sighting of the pipeline. This past March, Uzbekneftegaz, the state(cid:2)owned holding
company for Uzbekistan’s oil and gas assets, and CNPC agreed to postpone the start of construction of
the Uzbek section of Line D for an indefinite period. This was the third time the construction on this
stretch was delayed after its originally proposed start date of late 2015.
But as usual, those who are the thirstiest insist on the reality of the mirage. In July, Tajikistan’s
minister of energy and water resources, Usmonali Usmonzoda, claimed that a CNPC subsidiary,
Trans(cid:2)Asia Gas Pipeline Company, had started delivering equipment and machinery for the
Tajikistan section of the pipeline.
No details on the progress have emerged since then. CNPC, which is financing and operating the
project, coyly refrained from commenting.
If you invest in Novatek, the prospects for the incarnation of this apparition will increase in
importance as the company begins inviting partners for its second major project, Arctic LNG(cid:2)2.
So let’s try to find out what is really going on.
D is for detour
Line D is scheduled to deviate significantly from the rest of the Central Asia(cid:2)China corridor. The first three
lines – A, B and C – will have a combined annual capacity of 55 bcm, with 35 bcm of this reserved for
Turkmenistan. They run parallel to each other across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Lines A and B, with a
combined capacity of 30 bcm, carry gas exclusively from Turkmenistan, while Line C also supplies gas
from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Line C has been operational since 2014 and is expected to reach its full
capacity of 25bcm in 2018, once the last four compressor stations in Kazakhstan are cranked up.
Turkmenistan’s gas infrastructure
R U S S I A
Atyrau
A
E
S
N
A
I
P
S
A
C
A ZERBA I JA N
Baku
Trans(cid:2)Caspian
pipeline
East(cid:2)West
pipeline
Ashgabat
Tehran
I R A N
Gas field
Existing gas pipeline
Gas pipeline planned/proposed
Compressor stations
Source: IHS CERA, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
K A Z A K H S T A N
U Z B E K I S T A N
Central Asia – China pipeline A, B, C
Tashkent
Osh
K Y R G Y Z S T A N
Almaty
Bishkek
Khorgos
Lunnan
Urumqi
Turpan
T A J I K I S T A N
Dushanbe
Central Asia – China pipeline D
C H I N A
Galkynysh
Herat
A F G H A N I S T A N
Kabul
Islamabad
TAPI pipeline
P A K I S T A N
I N D I A
Fazilka
Quetta
Multan
Delhi
30
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
The 30 bcm Line D, if it is ever constructed, will cut across Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It
is set to carry gas from Phase Two of the Galkynysh field in Turkmenistan.
Why the deviation from the first three lines? China has never publicly commented on this, but there
are three possible reasons. First, this route is shorter. Second, as we wrote in our February 2014
report, China had hopes that Tajikistan could eventually develop the Bokhtar formation, where
estimated unrisked resources were assessed at 3.2 tcm: even if just one(cid:2)tenth of these could be
proven, eventual annual production could reach 10(cid:2)15 bcm. (Soviet geologists reportedly appraised
Tajik gas reserves – a step above resources – at 860 bcm). The Tajik government has offered a
massive sweetener in the form of a production sharing contract. From CNPC’s point of view, the risk
was small but the upside of owning reserves below the ground via the PSA and pretty much
everything above the ground via eventual service contracts must have been very appealing.
But Tajikistan borders China directly. Why then have the pipeline cross Kyrgyzstan, thus taking on
an additional political risk for seemingly no reason?
The third possible reason for the country(cid:2)hopping route is that China was trying to pull the small
Central Asian states into its economic orbit. Under that thinking, gas deliveries were always auxiliary
to the New Silk Road thinking that has become popular in Beijing.
That idea has not abated. Why, then, the delays, and will the pipeline ever get built? We see several
possible reasons for the delays:
█ China no longer needs this gas;
█ No commercial volumes were ever found in Tajikistan, and the gas is too difficult to extract in
Turkmenistan and pipe through the mountainous Tajikistan, raising the project’s costs;
█ Central Asian gas has become too expensive for China, partly because of the longer transportation leg.
Let’s look at each in turn.
China still needs the gas
Pipeline gas from Turkmenistan is China’s second largest source of gas, after LNG, accounting for 40%
of total imports.
China 2016 gas imports breakdown
China gas imports breakdown, bcm
40%
Turkmenistan
Pipeline
Uzbekistan
Myanmar
LNG
49%
6%
5%
80
60
40
20
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
LNG
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Myanmar
Source: IHS CERA
Source: IHS CERA
We analyzed Chinese gas demand in depth in our May report “Marking Territory.” The Chinese
government has long been focused on increasing the share of clean energy, largely by replacing coal
with gas. We estimated in our report that the coal(cid:2)to(cid:2)gas switch could generate an additional 40(cid:2)
115 bcm of gas demand by 2025, depending on which of the targets set out in China’s 13th Five(cid:2)
Year Plan are met (see the chart below).
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
31
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
█ The low end of the range is based on the government’s plan to boost gas(cid:2)fired power capacity
from 66 GW to 110 GW.
█ The high end is our estimate of the additional gas demand that would be generated from switching
all of the coal power capacity in the provinces of China’s 10 most polluted cities (based on PM2.5
emissions) to gas. The same amount of additional gas would be required to replace half of the coal
used in China’s power generation and industrial and residential heating, on our estimates.
Other targets in the plan could bring the amount of additional gas consumption to 133 bcm or 203
bcm, but we believe these goals are overly optimistic. We also assume that the targets will be
achieved by 2025, rather than 2020 (as in the plan).
Boost to China’s annual gas consumption from coal(cid:2)to(cid:2)gas switch, based on China’s 13th Five(cid:2)
Year Plan targets and our estimates, bcm
250
200
150
100
50
0
203
We assume these to be the high and low
cases for deliveries through 2025
133
115
45
40
Increase share of gas
in energy to 10%
(calculated)
Increase share of gas
in energy to 8.3%
(calculated)
Move the most polluted
areas to gas or replace
half of coal use
(Sberbank CIB estimate)
Move the most polluted
areas partly to gas
(explicit figure)
Increase gas(cid:2)fired
capacity
from 66 GW to 110 GW
(calculated)
Note: The calculated and explicit figures in this chart are based on China’s 13th Five(cid:2)Year Plan, unveiled in late 2016, and the sector supplements to the plan,
released in early 2017,
Source: China National Development and Reform Commission, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
The range between various above targets is quite wide. The difference between our high and low(cid:2)
end scenarios is roughly equal to the entire amount of Russian LNG capacity that is expected to be
online by 2022(cid:2)25, or almost all of the US LNG capacity currently under construction.
Gas use created by China’s different realistic coal(cid:2)to(cid:2)gas programs, bcmpa
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
The difference between what we think are both realistic estimates for additional gas use
resulting from China’s government(cid:2)directed coal(cid:2)to(cid:2)gas switch is equivalent to all of
Russia’s LNG capacity currently existing or likely to come online in the next several years.
Low case*
Yamal LNG (4
trains)
Arctic LNG(cid:2)2
(3 trains)
Sakhalin(cid:2)2
(2 trains)
Sakhalin(cid:2)2
expansion (1 train)
High case**
* China’s 13th five(cid:2)year development plan’s target of moving from 66 GW of gas(cid:2)fired capacity to 110 GW
** substituting half of the coal used in the most polluted provinces for gas
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Although the track record of past five(cid:2)year plans is rather underwhelming, the recently intensifying
rhetoric regarding air pollution control means the upper end of the range is more achievable.
32
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This August, China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection introduced the “2+26” plan, which aims
to cut PM2.5 emissions (the main contributor to air pollution) by 15% between October 2017 and
March 2018 in Beijing, Tianjin and 26 cities in the surrounding provinces of Hebei, Shandong,
Shanxi and Henan – the areas with the highest pollution levels in the country. The ministry also
asked CNPC to complete the fourth Shaan(cid:2)Jing pipeline by end October (the pipeline is designed to
transport 25 bcmpa of gas to Northeastern China, from Shaanxi to Beijing via Hebei) and
demanded that China’s three NOCs speed up the construction of underground gas storage units.
Amid the intensifying push toward gas, China already looks set to experience gas shortages this
winter. According to Interfax, a number of industry experts expect NOCs to raise gas prices this
winter for nonresidential consumers in response to high demand. They are also expected to draw
from storage and increase LNG imports. Interfax reported that over 3 mln households in 28 cities
are expected to move from coal to gas or electricity this winter, which we estimate as equivalent to
circa 11 bcm of additional gas demand.
The environmental push has been felt across various sectors of the economy. China cut 68 mtpa of
steelmaking capacity in 2016, along with 110 mtpa of highly polluting induction furnace capacity,
in part to meet environmental targets. A further 50 mtpa of capacity cuts are planned for this year.
Over 150 mtpa of coal production capacity is scheduled to be shut down, and at least 50 GW of
planned new coal(cid:2)fired power generation capacity will be suspended or postponed (from 940 GW
in 2016), while another 120 GW of capacity will be cancelled. The utilities sector continues to
gradually phase out coal(cid:2)fired plants in favor of gas(cid:2)powered plants, while the production of gas(cid:2)
fueled heavy(cid:2)duty trucks increased more than fivefold y(cid:2)o(cid:2)y in 7m17, according to Interfax.
This all leads us to believe that the project delay is not due to an expected lack of demand in 2020 or
beyond.
Turkmen gas is difficult, and the Tajik bonanza is still far off
Line D is complex and expensive from a technical standpoint, as it is intended to pass through the
mountainous terrain of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and will require the construction of 40 tunnels in
Tajikistan alone. Mountains cover over 90% of the surface of Tajikistan. This includes three major
mountain systems, two of which also cover over 65% of Kyrgyzstan.
As a result, according to media reports, China’s Ministry of Commerce estimates the cost of
construction for the 1,000 km Line D at $8 bln. Some $3.2 bln of the cost would apply to the 400
km stretch through Tajikistan.
For comparison, Line A reportedly costs $7.3 bln, despite being almost twice as long (1,830 km).
However, it had just half of the capacity. Line B was then added for an additional $3.8 bln to double
the capacity, or a combined $11.1 bln capex (in nominal terms, according to Wood Mackenzie) for
30 bcm of capacity of both lines. Per volume of gas delivered, then, the 30 bcm Line D is still a bargain.
The source gas at Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh field has very high carbon dioxide (CO2) and hydrogen
sulfide (H2S) content, and is known as “sour gas.” It therefore needs to be cleaned at “gas sweetening”
units before being sent through the pipeline. The field’s reserves are also located at a depth of nearly
5,000 meters, which means a very high level of pressure. Therefore, the production and processing of
such gas entail higher costs and environmental risks. We discussed the gas at Galkynysh in more detail in
our February 2014 report. Galkynysh’s capex per mcm is broadly in line with that of other sour gas fields
in the region, such as Lukoil’s assets in Uzbekistan. However, it is almost three times higher than at the
conventional gas fields of Gazprom and Novatek (see the chart below).
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
33
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Upstream development cost, $/mcm of capacity
323
Galkynysh development costs are in line with those of
sour gas in Uzbekistan’s Amu Darya region…
286
… but three times higher than for
conventional gas in Russia’s
Yamalo(cid:2)Nenetsk Region.
116
95
400
300
200
100
0
Galkynysh,
30 bcm
(Turkmengas)
Lukoil’s sour
gas fields in
Uzbekistan,
17.5 bcm
(Lukoil)
South Russkoye,
25 bcm
(Gazprom/Wintershall
/Uniper)
Yurkharovskoye,
38 bcm
(Novatek)
Source: IEA, Severneftegazprom, Novatek, Lukoil, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
This may indeed be the real problem for China. If the prospects for Galkynysh Phase 2 turn out to be less
than bright, then the hope could have been that gas for Tajikistan would provide enough volumes to fill up
the pipeline. But the JV between Tethys Petroleum, France’s Total and CNPC, charged with finding the gas
in the Bokhtar area, has collapsed into mutual recriminations and lawsuits (Tajikistan has piled in too).
We think the treacherous terrain combined with no progress on the Tajik gas may certainly have
played a role in the delay. But in the next section, we will address what we see as the crux of the
matter – China is looking for a better deal.
The real issue: China is seeking a price cut
“The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery
with which [the bourgeoisie] batters down all Chinese walls….”
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto
Although gas from Turkmenistan is sold at China’s western border at competitive prices, the cost of
transportation within China to consumption centers in the East is estimated at around $4 per
MMBtu, according to the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
On the one hand, this makes Central Asian gas uncompetitive against LNG, since LNG is delivered
almost directly to industrial customers on China’s eastern seaboard. So China may not be all that
interested in expanding the infrastructure for gas from Central Asia not because it does not require
the gas, but because the gas enters China at the wrong end.
China gas import prices by source, August 2017, $/MMBtu
China gas import prices by source, $/MMBtu
5.2
7.5
5.3
10
8
6
4
2
0
n
a
t
s
h
k
a
z
a
K
n
a
t
s
i
k
e
b
z
U
n
a
t
s
i
n
e
m
k
r
u
T
S
U
a
i
l
a
r
t
s
u
A
a
i
s
e
n
o
d
n
I
a
i
s
y
a
a
M
l
r
a
t
a
Q
r
a
m
n
a
y
M
g
v
a
G
N
L
g
v
a
e
n
i
l
e
p
P
i
i
a
e
n
u
G
w
e
N
a
u
p
a
P
Note: Orange bars indicate pipeline gas; green bars indicate LNG.
Source: IHS CERA
10
8
6
4
2
0
a circa 20%
premium
$9.2/MMBtu
$4/MMBtu
Transportation
within China*
$5.2/MMBtu
Price at the
border
$7.5/MMBtu
Turkmenistan
LNG, avg
* via the West(cid:2)East Gas Pipeline II to Shanghai
Source: IHS CERA, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Sberbank Investment Research
6.5
g
v
a
l
l
a
r
e
v
O
34
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
On the other hand, CNPC, which markets the gas, pays the transport costs to its 86% subsidiary
PetroChina. So one wonders why they should particularly care. Well, perhaps they care because the
tariff, which captures the investments into the pipeline, reflects the $8 bln that they would have to
invest into the new pipeline in the first place. In other words, CNPC does not care about the costs
already sunk into Lines A(cid:2)C, expressed in the $4/MMBtu tariff it pays to its subsidiary. But it does
not want to spend money on a new pipeline.
If so, then what it really needs is to receive a price cut. And this may be the best time in decades to get
one. Turkmenistan finds itself in a rather vulnerable position: China is its only remaining export customer.
Only a few years ago, there were concerns over whether Turkmenistan had enough gas at
Galkynysh and its older fields to service its supply contracts with China, Russia and Iran, and to
potentially begin to supply India, Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as via the prospective TAPI
(Turkmenistan(cid:2)Afghanistan(cid:2)Pakistan(cid:2)India) pipeline – all this in addition to supplying the gas(cid:2)
hungry domestic market. In fact, in early 2014, in order to save up gas for export, the Turkmen
government abolished the unlimited free gas allowances for the population and requested to install
metering equipment in households. It also launched a media campaign promoting energy efficiency
(see our report “Two Weddings and One Funeral”).
Turkmenistan’s customer base started to crumble in 2009, when Gazprom sharply cut its imports –
from over 40 bcm per year to just 12 bcm – following a pipeline explosion widely suspected of
having been staged. Early last year, Gazprom stopped purchases altogether. Although export
volumes to Russia the year before were commercially insignificant at just around 3 bcm, having
another buyer gave Turkmenistan some leverage in its negotiations with Iran and China.
Turkmenistan gas exports by destination, bcm
Turkmenistan gas exports by destination, 2016
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1%
33%
China
Iran
Kazakhstan
66%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
China
Iran
Kazakhstan
Russia
Source: IHS Energy Eurasia Gas Export Outlook
Source: IHS Energy Eurasia Gas Export Outlook
This January, another tap was turned off. Amid a prolonged dispute over payments for gas supplies,
Turkmenistan abruptly halted exports to Iran during the winter period of peak demand, requesting
repayment of $1.8 bln of debt for supplies since 2013. In response, the National Iranian Gas
Company (NIGC) accused its counterparty of breach of contract and threatened to file a request
with the International Court of Arbitration (ICA). The incident prompted Iran to speed up the
construction of the Damghan(cid:2)Neka pipeline, which was launched this August. The 170 km pipeline,
with a capacity of 14.6 bcm, was built to supply gas to the country’s northern provinces. Despite
Iran’s substantial gas reserves, it was cheaper and easier to buy gas from Turkmenistan than to
extend own network. Hedayat Omidvar, a communications officer for NIGC, told Interfax that the
new pipeline could theoretically allow Iran to do away with gas imports from Turkmenistan
altogether. Neither side has actually filed for arbitration as of yet, despite continuing threats, which
makes us believe the parties are eager to reach an agreement after all. It is therefore possible that
Iran will continue importing some gas from Turkmenistan, at least to cover peak demand.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
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OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Iran gas imports by source, bcm
Iran gas consumption sources, 2016
20
16
12
8
4
0
7.1% 0.1%
Indigenous
production
Imports from
Turkmenistan
Imports from
Azerbaijan
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Turkmenistan
Azerbaijan
Source: IHS Energy Eurasia Gas Export Outlook
92.8%
Source: IHS Energy Eurasia Gas Export Outlook
What other options remain for Turkmenistan? The proposed TAPI pipeline, which has been in the
design phase since 1997, would carry 33 bcm of gas over 1,814 km from Turkmenistan’s
Galkynysh field (Phase Three) to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Its development is being carried
out by a consortium of the four countries led by Turkmenistan. Officially, the pipeline is expected to
be completed by end 2020. So far, however, there have been vague signs of activity, and only in
two of the countries involved: Turkmenistan has built just 6 km of its 214 km section, while Pakistan
is still in the FEED stage. The longest stretches of the pipeline will pass through Afghanistan (774
km) and Pakistan (826 km). So far no work has been done on these sections, and security issues
related to the Taliban insurgency are likely to hinder any further progress. We believe that the
pipeline is unlikely to go ahead, at least as long as the political instability in the region persists. If
TAPI were to be cancelled, then its feeder gas from the third phase of Galkynysh could potentially go
toward doubling the capacity of Line D.
This situation, the opposite of what we were seeing just a few years back, puts Turkmenistan in a position
where it needs to secure access to the Chinese market at all costs. This might result in price dumping to
incentivize the construction of Line D. Perhaps this is exactly what the Chinese are waiting for.
But soon it may be too late for Turkmenistan to entice the Chinese, because a different option is
hovering on the horizon.
Arctic LNG(cid:2)2 as a direct competitor to Line D
We believe China will take all the gas supplied by pipelines, and treat LNG as a balancing item
between the country’s consumption on the one hand, and its indigenous production and pipeline
deliveries on the other. We currently estimate 80 bcm supplied to China from Central Asia by 2020,
because we assume that Line D will be launched.
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Room for LNG in China’s gas balance, bcm
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
Room for LNG in 2025:
48(cid:2)163 bcm
2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E 2029E 2030E
Pipeline imports from Russia (Gazprom)
Pipeline imports from Central Asia
Demand, secular growth
Demand, high case for politically mandated switch**
* 40 bcm of consumption more than under secular trend by 2025
** 115 bcm of consumption more than under secular trend by 2025
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Pipeline imports from Myanmar
Indigenous production
Demand, low case for politically mandated switch*
However, Lines A(cid:2)C would provide only 55 bcm of capacity. So if Line D were cancelled, it could
open up space for an additional 25 bcm of demand for LNG against our projections.
This would very neatly open up room for Novatek, whose 25 bcm Arctic LNG(cid:2)2 project is scheduled
to launch in 2022(cid:2)23: probably about the same time that Line D were to realistically launch.
Novatek can offer CNPC something it values at a premium: participation in the integrated project,
which is more than what Turkmenistan has been offering. The Russian government, meanwhile, is
considering lowering taxes on dividends that CNPC and its compatriot Silk Road Fund stand to
receive from Yamal LNG and perhaps the future LNG project. This is a very timely gesture of
hospitality – a virtue that Central Asia used to be known for.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
37
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
What Happened to the Russian Arctic?
In this section, we return to the topic of offshore Arctic expansion, which we last discussed in April
2011. We had not heard much on the subject at all since until just recently, when the head of the
Natural Resources Ministry announced that Rosneft had added 81 mln tonnes of crude oil reserves
after exploring Khatanga Bay in the Laptev Sea in the East Arctic.
If these locales seem unfamiliar, it is because they are about as remote as you can get in Russia – which is
saying a lot. Back in 2014, however, Russia’s Arctic offshore was on the lips of many energy executives.
ExxonMobil and Rosneft drilled an expensive well and found a field in the Kara Sea, which they named
Pobeda (“Victory”). And then, silence. So what happened? Sanctions are far from the only problem for
the offshore Arctic. We decided to find out what’s really going on there. Our findings are especially
relevant, because at least one Russian company is set to continue exploration and development there.
Defining the Arctic and offshore
Technically, “Arctic” means north of the Arctic Circle, which is near the 66th parallel. This is the area that
would get one 24(cid:2)hour day and one 24(cid:2)hour night each year were it not for atmospheric refraction.
Main explored oil and gas areas in the offshore Arctic
Chukchi
Sea
Prudhoe Bay
oil and gas field
ALASKA
Beaufort
Sea
Area with potentially more
than 3 tcm of natural gas
and over 10 bln bbl of oil.
CANADA
Arctic
Ocean
North Pole
A R C T I C
C
I
R
C
L
E
RUSSIA
Area leased to
Rosneft
Kara
Sea
GREENLAND
ICELAND
Norwegian
Sea
Source: US Geological Survey
38
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
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OCTOBER 2017
The Arctic Circle cuts well into the northern part of Russia. The port of Murmansk, for instance, is
considered to be within it. So was 81% of Russian gas production last year, along with 17% of oil
and condensate output. Almost all of this production took place onshore, though. Of the 346 Arctic
oil and gas fields in Russia with established reserves, only 19 are located offshore.
In this section, we are mainly focused on the Arctic offshore. Russia produces offshore oil and gas
from 13 fields spread across six seas, but there are only two major offshore fields in the Arctic.
These two fields contributed only a respective 0.5% and 5.3% of Russia’s total oil and gas
production last year. This year, offshore oil and condensate output will total around 28 mln tonnes
and be dominated by the Sakhalin(cid:2)1 and Sakhalin(cid:2)2 PSA projects. Lukoil’s Caspian fields have also
become significant contributors. These fields are generally viewed as being “offshore” in terms of
the difficulty of development and based on the general definition of the word. However, we feel the
need to acknowledge Lukoil’s justified annoyance with this, as the Caspian is not really a sea, but
rather an inland lake – the world’s largest. So the company’s projects there are, in a sense, onshore.
The US and the European Union did not even impose sanctions on them.
Arctic offshore oil production this year is projected at about 4.5 mln tonnes, or only 16% of the
country offshore total. This figure
is attributable entirely to two fields: Gazprom Neft’s
Prirazlomnoye and Novatek’s Yurkharov.
Russian offshore oil and condensate production, mln tonnes
The Sakhalin(cid:2)1 and Sakhalin(cid:2)2
PSA projects continue to
dominate Russia’s offshore
output.
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2004
2005
2006
2007
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
Sakhalin(cid:2)1
Sakhalin(cid:2)2 North Chaivo Odoptu Yuri Korchagin
Filanovsky Kravtsovskoye
Prirazlomnoye Yurkharov*
* production from transitional field under the Taz Bay
Source: CDU TEK, Interfax, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Many will be surprised to see us treat Novatek’s Yurkharov field as “offshore,” and we admit that we
are stretching the definition a bit. While Yurkharov is indeed submerged under the Taz Bay, its
producing central and western domes are tapped via 3 km(cid:2)long horizontal wells that start onshore. So
it is technically “transitional.” The field has been in production since 2003 and is the only gas and
condensate project technically classified as “Arctic offshore.” Yurkharov’s gas output peaked at 38.2
bcm in 2014 and will decline to below 30 bcm this year. Novatek has implemented geotechnical
measures to ensure a smooth decline in production in the years to come, most likely through
developing the nearby onshore West Yurkharov field or tapping into the Jurassic layers.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
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OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Yurkharov gas and condensate production
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015 2017E 2019E 2021E 2023E 2025E 2027E 2029E
Source: Novatek, Interfax, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Gas, bcm
Liquids, mln tonnes (rhs)
Prirazlomnoye is the only fully offshore Arctic oil field in the development stage. It is located in the
Pechora Sea and has been producing oil since late 2013. Production there looks set to peak at
around 4.8 mln tonnes in 2022. This rather unique project has had its share of well(cid:2)documented
problems, but it has nonetheless provided a good testing ground for Russia to gain valuable
experience operating in Arctic waters.
Prirazlomnoye production, mln tonnes
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Source: Gazprom Neft, Argus FSUE, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Oil production
Cumulative production (rhs)
In contrast to offshore oil, Russia’s offshore gas production, which ranges from 50 to 60 bcmpa or
about 8(cid:2)10% of Russia’s total gas score, is quite significant. However, these figures are inflated, as
the bulk of reported production is either output from Novatek’s transitional Yurkharov gas and
condensate field or production from the Sakhalin(cid:2)1 PSA project, more than 70% of which is re(cid:2)
injected, since there are no marketing opportunities as of yet. Last year, these two projects
contributed about 70% of Russia’s total offshore gas output.
40
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OCTOBER 2017
Russian gas output, bcm
800
600
400
200
0
12%
9%
6%
3%
0%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017E
Offshore gas output*
Total gas output
Offshore share in total (rhs)
* including production at Yurkharov
Source: Interfax, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
So while there is a lot going on onshore the Russian Arctic, not much is happening in the harder to
access offshore part of the region.
Russia’s Arctic offshore was once frequently discussed. It was hated by financial analysts, loved by
the government and eyed with interest by many oil company executives. What has since made it
much less attractive is gas.
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
41
4
2
S
B
E
R
B
A
N
K
C
B
I
I
N
V
E
S
T
M
E
N
T
R
E
S
E
A
R
C
H
Russian Arctic offshore oil and gas discoveries and licenses
80°
A R C T I C
O C E A N
C H U K C H I
8
9
S E A
E A S T
S I B E R I A N
S E A
7
3
12
2
Stokman
1
11
B A R E N T S
10
13
S E A
Pobeda
17
4
16
15
Prirazlomnoye
14
20
18
21
19
24
25
26
K A R A
S E A
22
23
27
28
29
30
Yurkharov
5
L A P T E V
S E A
9
31
Khatangskiy
6
Tsentralno(cid:2)Olginskoye
S E A
O F
O K H O T S K
Rosneft
Gazprom
Other
Gas fields
Oil fields
Gas/oil and condensate fields
Qostanay
Oil and gas license blocks
Oil and gas fields with partially explored reserves
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Fedynsky
Centralno(cid:2)Barentsevskiy
Perseyevskiy
Vostochno(cid:2)Prinovozemelskiy
Severo(cid:2)Karskiy
Khatangskiy – transit
Anisino(cid:2)Novosibirskiy
Severo(cid:2)Vrangelevskiy
Yuzhno(cid:2)Chukotskiy
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Stokman
Ledoviy
Ludlovskiy
Murmanskoye
Medynskoye(cid:2)More
Prirazlomnoye
Dolginskoye
Pobeda
Kruzenshternovskoye
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Kharasavey
Leningradskoye
Rusanov
Severo(cid:2)Obskoye
Vostochno(cid:2)Tambeyskoye
Chugoryakhinskoye
Severo(cid:2)Kamennomyskoye
Kamennomyskoye(cid:2)More
Tota(cid:2)Yakhinskoye
28
29
30
31
Antipayutinskoye – transit
Semakov – transit
Yurkharov – transit
Tsentralno(cid:2)Olginskoye
b
A
Source: Natural Resources Ministry, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
O
C
T
O
B
E
R
2
0
1
7
R
U
S
S
I
A
N
O
I
L
A
N
D
G
A
S
(cid:2)
T
O
M
O
R
R
O
W
I
S
A
D
I
S
T
A
N
T
M
E
M
O
R
Y
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
The main problem: Too much gas
There are no reliable estimates of initial recoverable oil and gas resources for Russia’s 14 seas, which
account for 22% of the world’s offshore acreage. The estimates of oil and gas resources for the
Russian offshore that are available add up to a total of around 100 btoe (or 730 bln boe). However,
they were made in the 1990s and early 2000s and have not been substantially revised since.
Russian offshore oil and gas resources, % of total
Caspian
3.5%
Other
offshore**
1.1%
Other Far
Eastern
offshore*
1.7%
Okhotsk
8.9%
Barents
25.6%
The offshore stretching
from the Barents Sea to
the Chukchi Sea
accounts for about 85%
of Russia’s total offshore
oil and gas resources, or
more than 100 btoe.
The Kara Sea looks the
most promising.
Chukchi
3.4%
East Siberian
5.7%
Laptev
3.3%
Kara (gulfs
and inlets)
7.0%
Pechora
5.1%
Kara (less gulfs
and inlets)
34.8%
Note: Including cumulative production.
* Bering and Japan seas
** Black, Azov and Baltic seas
Source: Natural Resources Ministry, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
But of course we have a better idea about reserves, because these are a product of exploration. And
what we know is that the offshore holds mostly gas. According to the Natural Resources Ministry’s
2015 estimates, offshore liquids reserves (including “transitional” fields with both onshore and
offshore sections) totaled 1.69 bln tonnes (or 12.3 bln bbl), while gas reserves amounted to 13.19
tcm (or about 83 bln boe).
Russia’s offshore recoverable oil and gas reserves, mtoe
Russia’s offshore oil and natural gas reserves
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
The Russian Arctic is home to more than 20 explored offshore
fields, or about a third of the Russian offshore total.
Oil, mln tonnes
Fields ABC1
% C2 Fields ABC1
Gas, bcm
%
C2
The Arctic offshore reserves
are mostly gas, which limits
the region’s potential to
become a source of new
energy supplies.
Barents Sea*
Kara Sea**
Total Arctic
Sea of Okhotsk
Other offshore***
Total offshore
5
1
6
7
12
25
105
0
105
313
209
17% 311
0% 144
17% 455
50% 96
33% 44
7 4,192
9 2,053
16 6,245
56% 1,090
27% 2,215
83% 3,305
9
11
949
336
13%
4%
250
461
627 100% 595
36 7,530 100% 3,517
Note: Not accounting for transitional fields where most of the explored reserves are located onshore.
* including the Pechora Sea
Barents Sea*
Kara Sea**
Sea of Okhotsk
Other
offshore***
** accounting for the not yet fully assessed Pobeda discovery
*** mainly the Russian section of the Caspian Sea
Oil
Gas
Note: ABC1+C2 reserves.
* including the Pechora Sea
** accounting for the not yet fully assessed Pobeda discovery
*** mainly the Russian section of the Caspian Sea
Source: Natural Resources Ministry
Source: Natural Resources Ministry, Interfax, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
As for resources (not reserves) – that is, what is potentially available out there – the ministry’s
estimates were 20.79 bln tonnes (150 bln bbl) for liquids and 94.53 tcm (595 bln boe) for gas.
These figures were not much higher than the estimates made 20 years ago.
The picture does not change when we isolate Russia’s biggest offshore area, the Arctic. The Arctic
offshore comprises mainly shallow aquifers of the Arctic Ocean. In this research, we are focusing on
the aquifers of the seven seas north of the Arctic Circle. Their subsoil harbors about 85 btoe (more
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
43
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
than 620 bln boe) of potential recoverable hydrocarbon reserves, or 85% of the country’s total
offshore endowment. There are a few things that need to be pointed out about these resources:
█ About 85% of the Arctic offshore total is in the Western Arctic (the Barents, Pechora and Kara seas);
█ The total exploration levels are very low – less than 6% for oil and 10% for gas;
█ Russia’s Arctic offshore harbors mainly gas (80(cid:2)85% of the total); for comparison, the much
smaller resource base off the shore of Alaska is about evenly split between oil and gas.
A quick glance at the chart below depicting the reserves of Russia’s main Arctic offshore fields
confirms that the reserves are mostly gas and demonstrates the Stokman field’s clear dominance.
However, gas is quite abundant in Russia and is more accessible onshore, which limits offshore gas’s
potential as a source of future energy supplies.
ABC1 reserves of main Russian offshore Arctic fields, mtoe
Russia’s ABC1 (close to 2P under PRMS)
Arctic offshore reserves are heavily skewed
toward natural gas, a resource that is more
abundant and accessible onshore. Arctic
offshore oil also looks too expensive and risky
at the current prices due to financial,
environmental and technological constraints.
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
a
d
e
b
o
P
n
a
m
k
o
t
S
y
e
v
a
s
a
r
a
h
K
v
o
k
a
m
e
S
v
o
n
a
s
u
R
e
y
o
k
s
n
y
d
e
M
*
v
o
r
a
h
k
r
u
Y
e
r
o
M
(cid:2)
s
y
m
o
n
n
e
m
a
K
s
y
m
o
n
n
e
m
a
K
(cid:2)
o
r
e
v
e
S
*
*
e
y
o
k
s
n
g
o
D
i
l
l
v
o
d
u
L
e
y
o
v
o
d
e
L
e
y
o
k
s
n
a
m
r
u
M
e
y
o
n
m
o
z
a
r
i
r
P
l
*
*
e
y
o
k
s
d
a
r
g
n
n
e
L
i
i
e
y
o
k
s
n
h
k
a
y
r
o
g
u
h
C
Liquids
Gas
* the eastern and central part of the field located offshore in the Taz Bay
** the unreliability of early reserve estimates is highlighted by the still little explored Dolginskoye
and Leningradskoye fields; the former may contain more gas than oil, while the latter is now
believed to have more than 1 tcm of gas
Source: Natural Resources Ministry, Gazprom, Interfax, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
There was a time when the high gas content of offshore reserves was seen as a positive. This was back
when it was thought that this gas was going to be the main source of Russia’s future LNG exports. A
consortium of Gazprom, Total and Statoil hoped to supply up to 67 bcmpa of LNG from Stokman to the
US market. But by 2014, the project’s operating consortium had closed its offices in Paris and
Murmansk, fired about 700 employees and written down more than $1.5 bln worth of investments.
Gazprom today touts abandoning the project as one of its main strategic successes of the past
decade. What happened, of course, was the shale gas revolution in the US, which turned the
country from a net importer into an exporter of gas. Even as this was happening, global LNG
supplies were increasing, causing prices to fall to little more than a third of the 2012(cid:2)13 highs.
44
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US gas output, bcm
Global LNG supply, bcm
800
750
700
650
600
550
500
450
400
Shale gas
takes off
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0
7
9
1
3
7
9
1
6
7
9
1
9
7
9
1
2
8
9
1
5
8
9
1
8
8
9
1
1
9
9
1
4
9
9
1
7
9
9
1
0
0
0
2
3
0
0
2
6
0
0
2
9
0
0
2
2
1
0
2
5
1
0
2
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
4
0
0
2
6
0
0
2
8
0
0
2
0
1
0
2
2
1
0
2
4
1
0
2
6
1
0
2
E
8
1
0
2
E
0
2
0
2
E
2
2
0
2
E
4
2
0
2
Source: BP
Source: GIIGNL, IGU, BP, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Price of Indonesian LNG delivered to
Japan, $/MMBtu
25
20
15
10
5
0
3
0
0
2
4
0
0
2
5
0
0
2
6
0
0
2
7
0
0
2
8
0
0
2
9
0
0
2
0
1
0
2
1
1
0
2
2
1
0
2
3
1
0
2
4
1
0
2
5
1
0
2
6
1
0
2
7
1
0
2
Source: Bloomberg
Even earlier, when the “Golden Age of Gas” (the now infamous title of IEA’s mistimed 2011 report)
seemed to be looming, the development of offshore gas fields was seen as something of a luxury
given the vast amount of untapped onshore resources. BP estimates Russia’s proved gas reserves, all
onshore, at 32 tcm, or enough to maintain the current level of production for 50 years. Considering
that the replacement rate has remained well above 100% and has only been increasing, Russia’s
gas reserves are effectively unlimited. There is no reason to venture hundreds of miles from the
coast to develop more difficult offshore deposits.
The state won’t give up
So the recent exploration that has actually taken place in the Arctic has focused mainly on crude oil.
In 2011(cid:2)13, Rosneft, the Russian state(cid:2)controlled oil company, teamed up with Western partners
ExxonMobil, Statoil and Eni to set up JVs dedicated to E&P in the Russian Arctic offshore. The
Western partners took 33.3% stakes and agreed to provide the financing for a number of projects
through the exploration phase. The most successful of these ventures was the one between Rosneft
and ExxonMobil in the Kara Sea, which drilled the Pobeda well and in 2014 discovered one of the
two largest liquids structures in the offshore Russian Arctic.
However, progress has ground to a near halt. Since Pobeda in 2014, no major fields have been
discovered in Russia’s Arctic waters. In fact, spending on offshore Arctic exploration plummeted
from $1.8 bln in 2014 to $170 mln the next year. The two main culprits, of course, were the plunge
in oil prices and Western sanctions: Russia does not have the telemetric, drilling and marine
equipment, much less the financial resources, needed to explore the region. The sanctions
prohibited Western companies from participating in the E&D of offshore Arctic deposits more than
152 meters deep as well as shale oil deposits.
Does this mean that Arctic offshore exploration is essentially dead? Not if the Russian government
has anything to say about it. It is incentivizing development in the region with some of the lowest
taxes to be found in the country: a 5(cid:2)15% MET and zero export duties. The tax incentives, which
were outlined in the government’s order 443(cid:2)P in 2013, also include allowing operators to expense
funds set aside for the future decommissioning of offshore installations.
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State’s share of cash flows from international projects (at
10% discount rate)
(cid:2) Production tax rate of 5(cid:2)15%
(cid:2) Very low signature bonus
(cid:2) Lowest profit tax
(cid:2) No tax on extra revenue
Russia, gov. order 443(cid:2)P
Greenland
Canada (Arctic offshore)
PSA, Sakhalin(cid:2)2 type
Brazil offshore
Russia, CTR with TB
Norway
Russia, CTR without TB
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Note: Dark green indicates foreign projects. Light green indicates Russian projects.
Source: Natural Resources Ministry, Skolkovo
The government can point to several advantages of offshore Arctic development. Russia’s Arctic
offshore resources are far more abundant than those of Northern Canada, Greenland and Norway,
making the chances of commercial discovery higher. Punishment for environmental mishaps is also
likely more lax. This is important, given that the former US Minerals Management Service once
estimated the chances of an oil spill exceeding 1,000 gallons while drilling in the Chukchi Sea
offshore Alaska at about 40%, should one happen.
Another natural advantage for Russian development is that over the next few decades, a large
portion of the Arctic Ocean is expected to become ice(cid:2)free as a result of climate change. This would
facilitate E&P and potentially open up year(cid:2)round maritime transportation in the region, the latter of
which is a goal of Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR) project.
The NSR shortens travel time between Europe and the Asian(cid:2)Pacific and could one day handle up to
25% of the sea trade between the regions. Getting from the port of Murmansk in Northwestern
Russia to the Chinese port of Ningbo would take just 20(cid:2)23 days instead of the 35(cid:2)38 days
required when crossing through the Suez Canal. A trip from Rotterdam to Shanghai via the NSR
would also take two fewer weeks than a voyage through the Suez Canal. The time savings would
only increase if the plans to develop a higher(cid:2)latitude route (only 2,890 km long, compared with
3,500 km for the littoral route) come to fruition. Last year, Russia’s Northern Sea Route
Administration issued 718 navigation permits, including 144 for foreign ships.
The NSR would, however, provide the greatest benefit to Russia, which has recently seen a surge in
shipping volumes for energy, metals, agricultural products and other goods. Meanwhile, Novatek is
on the verge of exporting at least 17.5 mtpa of LNG from its Yamal LNG project, while Gazprom
Neft will soon ship up to 8.0 mtpa of oil from its Novoport field on the coast of the Gulf of Ob in the
Kara Sea and ramp up to 4.8 mtpa of oil output from its platform at Prirazlomnoye, also in the Kara
Sea. Norilsk Nickel, the Timan(cid:2)Pechora oil projects, Lukoil’s Varandey Terminal in the Barents Sea
and mining projects in the Arctic Basin could also potentially use the route. This all translates into an
expected spike in NSR transportation volumes in 2021(cid:2)25.
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Northern Sea Route shipping volumes, past and future
potential, mln tonnes
80
60
40
20
0
75
6.5
3.7
5.4
7.7
21
1987
2014
2015
2016
2021*
2025*
* estimates from GEKON
Source: Neft Rossii
The real winner from the NSR project, however, will be gas, not oil. Russia is likely to offer cheaper
LNG over the next decade than any other competing supplier. The Russian LNG projects likely to go
ahead are all based either on fields within the Arctic Circle or around Sakhalin Island and would call
for transport by tanker through the harsh northern seas. After implementation of all Yamal LNG
projects, we expect up to 80 mln tonnes (over 108 bcm) of additional LNG to come onto the market.
The single biggest potential LNG project from Russia is based on the four Tambey group of fields,
currently owned by Gazprom. The second biggest is Arctic LNG(cid:2)2, which is scheduled to be
launched by Novatek in 2022(cid:2)23. Both of these projects stand to benefit from the NSR.
Russian LNG capacity, bcm
Existing
Sakhalin(cid:2)2 (Shell/Gazprom)
Under construction
Yamal LNG (Novatek/partners)
Likely to begin construction in 2018(cid:2)19
Arctic LNG(cid:2)2 (Novatek)
Yamal LNG 4th train (Novatek/partners)
Portovaya (Gazprom)
FID likely to be made
Tambey group (Gazprom, Novatek or RusGazDobycha)
Sakhalin(cid:2)2 (3rd train) or Sakhalin(cid:2)1 (Exxon/Rosneft)
Other proposed projects
Vladivostok LNG (Gazprom)
Baltic LNG (Gazprom)
Pechora LNG (Rosneft)
Total possible
Source: Companies, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Capacity at peak
15.8
15.8
22.4
22.4
28.4
25.0
1.4
2.0
64.7
57.2
7.5
27.0
13.6
10.0
3.4
158.3
Among the headwinds we can list for the NSR are inadequate knowledge of the Arctic Ocean and a
lack of infrastructure, modern port discharge technology and links to roads and railroads. Moreover,
a significant minority of climate experts expect the recent environmental changes to be temporary:
even climate alarmists have stopped talking about “global warming” and now refer to “climate
change” instead. The reversal of warming trends would make traveling the NSR without the
assistance of ice(cid:2)breakers and ice(cid:2)class vessels unfeasible. One way that Novatek, in particular, will
try to solve this risk for its Arctic LNG(cid:2)2 project is by building a reloading facility in Kamchatka that
will allow expensive ice(cid:2)class vessels to head back for more cargo, while the LNG will proceed to the
end destination on board cheaper conventional vessels. When the ice(cid:2)class vessels become
unneeded (during the summer), the reloading facility will simply lie idle.
So the Russian Arctic offers more resources, better tax rates, arguably laxer regulation and the
potential future upside from continued climate change. All of this, however, does not solve the key
problem: the fact that while the Russian Arctic offshore may well be competitive with the similarly
situated basins abroad, it is still far more challenging and less profitable than the Russian onshore.
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So why is the Russian government so eager to provide all these incentives for what is clearly an
uneconomical undertaking compared with conventional reserves?
The reason seems to be that it hopes to recapture the “Sputnik moment” and demonstrate that
Russia is capable of such a feat. We believe the government’s push is only tangentially related to
other factors commonly cited: geopolitics, “calling dibs” on acreage and creating a manufacturing
base to generate technology and jobs. The government, however, is not willing to be alone to pay
for its boreal Sputnik. So it has lined up someone else to do its bidding.
Rosneft’s burden
Several companies have licenses for offshore exploration, but since 2008, only the state(cid:2)owned
groups have been able to access the offshore Arctic.
Gazprom Neft owns the only producing oil asset in the region, the Prirazlomnoye field. The project
was initially expected to produce up to 7 mln tonnes per year, but this estimate has since been
scaled back to less than 5 mln tonnes. Moreover, it is not clear how long this plateau will last given
that the 2015 year(cid:2)end proven reserve score for the field was only 26 mln tonnes.
Gazprom Neft once intended to extend Prirazlomnoye’s life by connecting its platform to the nearby
Dolginskoye field. However, it eventually turned out that Dolginskoye appears to harbor mostly gas,
as is the case with most of the Arctic, so Gazprom Neft wisely put off development there. The
company’s management hasn’t spoken of pursuing other major projects in the Arctic offshore. On a
recent investor trip to the Arctic, Gazprom Neft assured us that it would proceed very cautiously and
that the strategic focus was on economic viability.
Gazprom is similarly cautious. It once had the grandest plans for the Arctic, mostly in gas of course,
and had explored 8 tcm of recoverable reserves (C1 under the Russian classification) about evenly
split between the Barents and Kara seas. As recently as 2014, Gazprom still hoped to more than
double its Arctic offshore reserves and launch no fewer than 12 new fields by 2024. But the change
in the economics of gas, which we discussed above, has pretty much scuppered these plans.
Gazprom Arctic offshore gas reserves, bcm
Barents Sea
Stokman
Ludlovskoye
Ledovoye
5 other fields
Kara Sea
Gulf of Ob
Severo(cid:2)Kamennomysskoye
Kamennomysskoye(cid:2)More
Other**
Taz Estuary
Semakov
Tota(cid:2)Yakhinskoye
Antipayutinskoye
Chugoryakhinskoye
Ob and Taz total
Yamal offshore
Kharasavey
Krusenstern
Leningradskoye
Rusanov
2 other fields
Yamal total
C1
C2
Expected C1*
4,111
3,939
80
92
0
461
0
131
330
0
5,681
3,939
185
257
1,300
4,162
2,656
13,636
403
535
0
319
113
215
43
1,627
1,259
965
71
240
0
2,535
27
0
0
0
11
20
4
63
365
710
981
539
0
2,594
425
535
1,444
338
124
275
47
3,188
1,814
2,262
2,242
2,430
1,700
10,448
19,317
Gazprom’s offshore Arctic total
8,273
3,118
* estimates by Gazprom accounting for C2 reserves and C3+D1 resources
** five established fields plus new explored structures
Source: Gazprom, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
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Gazprom may consider itself lucky, because its other projects (most notably a pipeline to China and
its two pipeline routes around Ukraine, Turkish Stream and Nord Stream 2) have prevented the
government from pressuring it into further Arctic exploration. It has been able to consistently scale
back its offshore ambitions.
Rosneft is a different matter. It clearly stands out in its zeal for the Arctic offshore. Andrei Shishkin,
the company’s vice president, stated at a recent international conference that Arctic development
was a task exceeding space exploration in importance. The company’s vision seems to be in sync
with the government’s grand “Sputnik moment” ambitions.
To be fair, Rosneft’s interest in the offshore Arctic has diminished following the drop in oil prices and
the introduction of Western sanctions. This year, it reduced its planned investment in the region
over 2017(cid:2)21 from the previous $4 bln to $2.5 bln. We fear, however, that its interest has not
waned enough.
Russian offshore hydrocarbon licenses
53
41
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
According to the natural resources
minister, as of February 27, 2017, there
were 138 hydrocarbon licenses for
Russian shelves and sea areas, including
7 state contracts, 53 licenses for Rosneft,
41 for Gazprom, 14 for Lukoil and 7 for
Novatek.
21
14
7
Rosneft
Gazprom
Lukoil
Novatek and
other
companies
Other*
* licenses under state contracts and for geological exploration
Source: Natural Resources Ministry
Rosneft holds 53 offshore licenses, about 40% of the Russian total. Its license areas harbor an
estimated 43 btoe of hydrocarbon resources. We have already discussed the most promising
project, the 2,115 meter(cid:2)long Pobeda well drilled in 2014 into the Universitetskaya structure in the
Kara Sea. That uncompleted well is estimated to have cost the Rosneft/ExxonMobil JV up to $500(cid:2)
600 mln. According to the above(cid:2)mentioned Andrei Shishkin, one completed exploration well in
Arctic waters costs some $1 bln and requires 13 support vessels. But the reserves it has discovered
need more drilling to become proven, and this has been indefinitely postponed by sanctions.
Rosneft’s other key project is in the Khatanga Gulf, which opens up into the Laptev Sea. The drilling
there, like at Yurkharov, is done from the shore, with a horizontal well long 5,500 meters targeting
deposits in the gulf. A similar fully onshore well drilled by Lukoil at a nearby license is reported to
cost about $200 mln. In June, Rosneft trumpeted a possible oil discovery at a depth of 2,300
meters. Then in October, the company announced it had added 81 mln tonnes of C1+C2
recoverable reserves from the Khatanga project. It claims that the oil is light and has little sulfur. Our
fear is that this may whet its geologists’ appetite for more exploration. However, the problem in
Khatanga is not finding crude oil, but rather producing it at a profit. There are no ports in the area,
and navigation is generally restricted to just two months out of the year.
Rosneft is not only exploring in the Arctic. It seeks to control development along the supply chain,
which suggests that its goal is eventual Arctic development autarky for Russia. The company is
engaged in several costly projects that could result in Russia gaining the ability to construct offshore
platforms, equipment and service ships. For instance, Rosneft has allocated R120 bln ($2 bln) to an
offshore construction complex in Murmansk that will produce concrete bases for drilling platforms
and service offshore fleets.
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However, the company’s most ambitious offshore service project is in Russia’s Far East. According to
Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin, Rosneft’s future investments into Zvezda Shipyard will be R145 bln ($2
bln), adding to the more than R22 bln ($350 mln) already ploughed into the construction. Slated
production at Zvezda includes tankers with DWT of up to 350,000 tonnes, 250,000 cm LNG(cid:2)
carriers, ice(cid:2)class vessels and parts for offshore production platforms for Arctic oil and gas fields.
The project was originally spurred by the government’s bright plans for the offshore, including the
mammoth Stokman gas and condensate project in the Barents Sea. However, after DSME, a key
Korean partner, exited the Stokman project in 2012, the project was revised and rescheduled.
Zvezda was transformed into a massive ball of geopolitical ambition to liberate Russia from its
dependence on offshore equipment, platforms and vessels. In 2015, a Rosneft(cid:2)Gazprombank JV
obtained a 75% stake in the consortium constructing the shipyard. Rosneft also contracted the
construction of 41 vessels and 12 offshore platforms at Zvezda. The shipyard will need many more
orders to warrant investment, which other Russian companies like Gazprom, Sovcomflot and
Novatek are reluctant to place even if pressured to do so by the government.
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Valuations
Comparative multiples(cid:2)based valuations
Expected dividend yields for companies we cover
Gazprom
Lukoil
Rosneft
Novatek
Gazprom Neft
Surgutneftegaz commons
Surgutneftegaz prefs*
Tatneft commons
Tatneft prefs
Bashneft commons**
Bashneft prefs**
KazMunaiGas EP
Transneft prefs***
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
6%
6%
2%
2%
4%
2%
2%
5%
7%
0%
0%
2%
4%
6%
7%
4%
3%
5%
2%
9%
6%
8%
5%
7%
3%
4%
6%
7%
5%
3%
6%
2%
7%
6%
8%
5%
7%
2%
4%
6%
7%
8%
3%
6%
2%
7%
6%
8%
5%
7%
2%
4%
*Surgutneftegaz 2017 preferred dividend is based on the assumption of USD/RUB closing
the year at 63
**for Bashneft, we assume a flat R20 bln dividend from 2017 onward (R113 per share); clarification
on the 2016 dividend and the general policy may come in November
***Transneft dividend assumes a 25% IFRS payout; the payout may rise to 50% as soon as next year
Note: For other assumptions used in calculating yields, please inquire with the Sberbank CIB Investment
Research team.
Source: Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Russia and FSU
Gazprom
Lukoil
Novatek
Gazprom Neft
Surgutneftegaz
Tatneft
Rosneft
Transneft
KazMunaiGas EP
Bashneft
Emerging markets
Sinopec
CNOOC
PetroChina
Petrobras
ONGC
Developed markets
Royal Dutch Shell
BP
ChevronTexaco
ConocoPhillips
ENI
Exxon Mobil
Statoil
Total
2017E
P/E
2018E
EV/EBITDA
2019E
2017E
2018E
2019E
5.6
6.5
18.3
4.7
4.3
7.8
13.6
6.9
4.6
5.5
11.5
13.6
58.1
13.1
9.5
17.6
22.7
30.2
200.5
23.6
24.2
17.1
13.4
3.7
6.0
15.6
4.1
5.6
7.5
9.8
6.8
6.2
3.6
11.0
11.9
40.7
10.0
8.4
15.8
17.3
24.8
41.3
19.6
21.5
18.5
12.7
4.3
6.2
13.2
4.1
5.8
7.6
6.1
6.2
6.4
3.2
9.7
9.6
27.1
6.6
8.1
14.0
14.6
21.3
33.4
17.0
19.6
16.3
11.8
3.2
3.4
11.0
3.9
neg
4.9
7.0
4.1
neg
3.4
3.7
4.6
6.1
5.5
4.6
6.4
6.1
8.5
10.2
4.6
9.7
3.8
6.3
2.7
3.1
11.2
3.8
neg
4.5
6.1
4.0
neg
2.7
3.4
4.3
5.9
4.8
4.2
5.7
5.5
7.4
7.4
4.1
8.8
3.7
5.5
2.9
3.1
11.1
4.0
neg
4.5
5.5
3.7
neg
2.5
3.1
3.8
5.2
4.1
4.0
5.2
4.9
6.6
6.9
3.7
8.5
3.4
5.1
Note: Based on prices as of October 17, 2017. Bloomberg consensus estimates are used for foreign
companies and Sberbank Investment Research estimates for Russian and FSU companies.
Source: Bloomberg, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
51
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Financial Profiles
Bashneft
Income statement (IFRS), $ mln
Revenues
Operating costs
EBIT
Depreciation
EBITDA
Net interest expenses
FX gain
Net other expenses
EBT
Tax
Income before minority interest
Minority interest
Net income
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Balance sheet (IFRS), $ mln
Fixed assets and investments
Current assets
Stock and inventories
Accounts receivable
Cash and securities
Other current assets
Total assets
Current liabilities
Accounts payable
Short(cid:2)term debt
Other current liabilities
Long(cid:2)term liabilities
Long(cid:2)term debt
Other long(cid:2)term liabilities
Total liabilities
Minority interest
Equity
Share capital
Retained earnings
Total liabilities and equity
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Cash flow statement, $ mln
EBT
Provisions and non(cid:2)cash items
Taxes
Interest paid
Decrease in working capital
Increase in other assets
Operating cash flow
Capital expenditures
Other investments
Free cash flow
Increase in debt
Dividends
Additional share issues/(purchases)
Net cash flow
FX and monetary effects on cash
Change in cash position
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
2013
2014
2015
17,658
15,111
2,547
628
3,175
(137)
34
(465)
1,980
(513)
1,467
(7)
1,460
16,765
14,670
2,095
618
2,714
(215)
6
(273)
1,613
(380)
1,233
1
1,235
10,061
8,504
1,557
546
2,103
(198)
(58)
(24)
1,277
(280)
997
(24)
973
2016
8,931
7,627
1,305
644
1,949
(164)
(87)
(84)
970
(191)
779
10
789
2017E
2018E
2019E
10,864
9,083
1,781
729
2,510
(305)
(13)
(83)
1,380
(301)
1,079
12
1,091
11,753
9,293
2,460
709
3,169
(298)
–
(60)
2,102
(458)
1,644
19
1,663
11,999
9,320
2,679
751
3,430
(262)
–
(60)
2,357
(514)
1,843
21
1,864
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
10,500
3,113
652
1,800
498
163
13,613
2,611
1,847
362
402
3,818
2,399
1,419
6,429
5
7,180
2,286
4,894
13,613
2013
1,980
1,288
(495)
(238)
136
(71)
2,599
(1,271)
459
1,788
(622)
(1,334)
66
(103)
(10)
(113)
6,902
2,406
469
967
939
32
9,308
1,977
992
508
477
3,712
2,783
928
5,689
139
3,481
1,483
1,997
9,308
2014
1,613
1,183
(387)
(313)
(70)
754
2,780
(1,230)
(1,060)
491
1,696
(981)
(511)
694
249
943
5,756
1,380
303
551
452
75
7,136
1,299
759
329
211
2,480
1,775
704
3,779
127
3,231
1,145
2,087
7,136
2015
1,277
884
(346)
(275)
153
(130)
1,563
(1,026)
60
597
(504)
(302)
–
(210)
3
(208)
7,581
2,050
482
1,001
124
443
9,631
1,804
1,380
399
26
3,465
2,405
1,060
5,269
47
4,314
1,375
2,939
9,631
2016
970
1,012
(241)
(100)
(694)
511
1,459
(1,261)
216
414
(301)
(437)
(48)
(371)
(58)
(429)
8,259
2,535
513
1,218
360
443
10,794
2,052
1,626
401
26
3,434
2,417
1,017
5,486
35
5,406
1,375
4,030
10,926
2017E
1,380
1,077
(343)
(312)
(2)
–
1,799
(1,461)
–
338
–
(0)
–
338
–
338
8,568
3,529
520
1,318
1,248
443
12,096
2,083
1,657
401
26
3,369
2,417
952
5,452
16
6,761
1,375
5,385
12,229
2018E
2,102
1,023
(523)
(314)
(75)
–
2,213
(1,017)
–
1,196
–
(308)
–
888
–
888
8,681
4,913
533
1,345
2,592
443
13,594
2,119
1,692
401
26
3,296
2,417
879
5,415
(6)
8,317
1,375
6,942
13,726
2019E
2,357
1,065
(587)
(314)
(6)
–
2,516
(865)
–
1,651
–
(308)
–
1,343
–
1,343
52
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
Gazprom
Income statement (IFRS), $ mln
Revenues
Operating costs
EBIT
Depreciation
EBITDA
Net interest expenses
FX gain
Net other expenses
EBT
Tax
Income before minority interest
Minority interest
Net income
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Balance sheet (IFRS), $ mln
Fixed assets and investments
Current assets
Stock and inventories
Accounts receivable
Cash and securities
Other current assets
Total assets
Current liabilities
Accounts payable
Short(cid:2)term debt
Long(cid:2)term liabilities
Long(cid:2)term debt
Deferred profit tax liability
Other long(cid:2)term liabilities
Total liabilities
Minority interest
Equity
Share capital
Retained earnings
Total liabilities and equity
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Cash flow statement, $ mln
EBITDA
Provisions and non(cid:2)cash items
Taxes
Decrease in working capital
Increase in other assets
Operating cash flow
Capex
Other investments
Free cash flow
Increase in debt
Interest paid
Dividends
Additional share issues/(purchases)
Net cash flow
FX and monetary effects on cash
Other sources/(uses) of funds
Change in cash position
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
165,311
115,220
50,090
13,175
63,265
(293)
(4,596)
1,646
46,847
(10,086)
36,762
(817)
35,944
145,880
111,233
34,647
12,385
47,033
515
(24,492)
1,464
12,134
(4,528)
7,606
(88)
7,518
98,994
78,948
20,046
8,465
28,511
757
(6,923)
1,899
15,779
(2,135)
13,644
(311)
13,333
91,320
80,681
10,638
8,573
19,211
326
6,707
1,276
18,948
(4,254)
14,694
(686)
14,008
109,322
95,193
14,129
10,010
24,139
451
(3,762)
1,586
12,403
(2,927)
9,477
(840)
8,636
109,943
93,208
16,734
11,830
28,564
144
–
1,875
18,754
(4,425)
14,329
(1,271)
13,058
109,209
95,041
14,167
12,743
26,910
178
–
1,767
16,112
(3,802)
12,310
(1,092)
11,219
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
316,844
87,026
17,320
31,374
20,950
17,383
403,870
42,301
32,210
10,091
73,277
44,689
16,990
11,599
115,578
9,569
283,318
9,886
273,432
408,466
206,406
61,522
11,943
18,592
18,454
12,533
267,929
32,990
24,728
8,262
56,907
39,533
10,560
6,814
89,897
5,394
174,491
5,780
168,710
269,781
177,694
54,797
11,036
15,288
18,648
9,825
232,491
29,152
20,284
8,869
55,057
38,361
8,485
8,211
84,210
4,460
145,296
4,462
140,834
233,966
223,870
53,322
11,725
17,887
14,784
8,926
277,192
31,683
24,313
7,371
58,613
39,279
11,351
7,983
90,296
5,726
182,906
5,361
177,545
278,928
239,136
59,021
14,757
16,883
18,455
8,926
298,157
40,583
31,747
8,068
64,043
43,581
12,479
7,983
104,626
6,566
188,614
5,361
183,253
299,807
254,134
60,743
14,295
16,979
20,543
8,926
314,877
39,812
30,196
8,766
70,051
47,883
14,184
7,983
109,863
7,837
198,745
5,361
193,383
316,444
269,083
62,082
14,442
16,865
21,848
8,926
331,166
40,873
30,477
9,464
75,818
52,186
15,649
7,983
116,691
8,928
207,035
5,361
201,674
332,654
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
63,265
2,915
(6,262)
(3,310)
(1,461)
55,148
(43,977)
(2,374)
11,171
4,022
(883)
(4,185)
6
7,757
674
165
8,596
47,033
8,674
(5,512)
(4,613)
4,308
49,890
(33,164)
(4,401)
16,726
(1,022)
(818)
(4,922)
(0)
5,562
3,012
(360)
8,213
28,511
3,596
(1,710)
(2,310)
4,871
32,958
(26,740)
(418)
6,218
1,107
(663)
(2,732)
–
3,512
1,328
1
4,841
19,211
2,505
(1,431)
361
2,366
23,012
(20,326)
(1,079)
2,686
(1,551)
(737)
(2,886)
(2,036)
(5,602)
(1,840)
(29)
(7,471)
24,139
932
(1,799)
5,407
(2,742)
25,937
(25,557)
1,817
380
5,000
(284)
(3,241)
–
3,671
–
–
3,671
28,564
0
(2,720)
(1,185)
82
24,741
(25,951)
1,541
(1,210)
5,000
(315)
(2,928)
–
2,088
–
–
2,088
26,910
(0)
(2,337)
248
82
24,903
(26,929)
1,605
(2,026)
5,000
(345)
(2,928)
–
1,305
–
–
1,305
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
53
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Gazprom Neft
Income statement (US GAAP), $ mln
Revenues
Operating costs
EBIT
Depreciation
EBITDA
Net interest expenses
FX gain
Net other expenses
EBT
Tax
Income before minority interest
Minority interest
Net income
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Balance sheet (US GAAP), $ mln
Fixed assets and investments
Current assets
Stock and inventories
Accounts receivable
Cash and securities
Other current assets
Total assets
Current liabilities
Accounts payable
Short(cid:2)term debt
Other current liabilities
Long(cid:2)term liabilities
Long(cid:2)term debt
Other long(cid:2)term liabilities
Total liabilities
Minority interest
Equity
Share capital
Retained earnings
Total liabilities and equity
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Cash flow statement, $ mln
EBITDA
Provisions and non(cid:2)cash items
Taxes
Decrease in working capital
Increase in other assets
Operating cash flow
Capex
Other investments
Free cash flow
Increase in debt
Interest paid
Dividends
Net cash flow
FX and monetary effects on cash
Change in cash position
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
47,195
40,235
6,960
2,410
9,370
(165)
(70)
350
7,074
(1,230)
5,845
(273)
5,571
44,414
38,601
5,814
2,257
8,070
(208)
(1,191)
(96)
4,319
(626)
3,693
(122)
3,571
27,269
23,592
3,676
1,615
5,291
(309)
(1,031)
264
2,600
(509)
2,092
(108)
1,984
25,566
21,972
3,593
1,962
5,556
(345)
433
245
3,927
(758)
3,169
(149)
3,020
33,245
28,008
5,237
2,287
7,524
(325)
94
400
5,405
(1,059)
4,346
(257)
4,089
33,516
27,935
5,582
2,265
7,847
(273)
–
862
6,171
(1,210)
4,961
(293)
4,668
33,926
28,969
4,956
2,420
7,376
(175)
–
1,395
6,176
(1,211)
4,965
(294)
4,672
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
34,369
13,165
2,743
2,655
2,769
4,999
47,535
6,321
3,608
1,593
1,119
10,874
7,948
2,926
17,195
1,380
28,960
589
28,370
47,535
2013
9,370
(1,071)
(1,210)
178
56
7,323
(6,523)
(1,452)
799
1,705
(447)
(1,936)
(66)
123
57
28,917
8,371
1,825
1,831
945
3,770
37,287
4,457
2,313
1,086
1,057
12,748
8,929
3,820
17,205
1,138
18,944
892
18,052
37,287
2014
8,070
1,090
(843)
338
(407)
8,248
(6,977)
(2,485)
(1,214)
1,871
(438)
(1,148)
(1,180)
703
(477)
27,095
7,008
1,405
1,307
1,567
2,729
34,102
4,789
2,126
2,021
642
12,183
9,204
2,979
16,972
1,254
15,876
610
15,266
34,102
2015
5,291
226
(719)
317
(10)
5,106
(5,693)
379
(207)
1,881
(593)
(563)
471
100
571
35,486
6,534
1,660
1,905
554
2,414
42,020
4,772
2,723
1,322
727
13,439
9,829
3,610
18,211
1,385
22,424
843
21,580
42,020
2016
5,556
(1,266)
(693)
(54)
254
3,795
(5,807)
852
(1,160)
(847)
(611)
(40)
(2,687)
(143)
(2,830)
39,198
7,978
1,975
2,477
1,111
2,414
47,176
6,398
3,360
2,312
727
13,485
9,746
3,740
19,884
1,642
25,650
843
24,807
47,176
2017E
7,524
170
(1,026)
(251)
(27)
6,390
(5,972)
122
541
1,000
(500)
(862)
178
–
178
42,388
8,696
1,974
2,498
1,809
2,414
51,083
6,367
3,328
2,312
727
13,485
9,746
3,740
19,852
1,936
29,296
843
28,452
51,083
2018E
7,847
(294)
(1,094)
(51)
(0)
6,408
(5,455)
587
1,540
–
(526)
(1,022)
(7)
–
(7)
44,343
10,678
2,008
2,528
3,727
2,414
55,021
6,506
3,467
2,312
727
13,485
9,746
3,740
19,991
2,230
32,800
843
31,957
55,021
2019E
7,376
(781)
(971)
74
(0)
5,698
(4,375)
1,074
2,398
–
(526)
(1,167)
705
–
705
54
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
KazMunaiGas EP
Income statement (IFRS), $ mln
Revenues
Operating costs
EBIT
Depreciation
EBITDA
Net interest expenses
FX gain (loss)
Net other expenses
EBT
Tax
Income before minority interest
Minority interest
Net income
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Balance sheet (IFRS), $ mln
Fixed assets and investments
Current assets
Stock and inventories
Accounts receivable
Cash and securities
Other current assets (cash deposits)
Total assets
Current liabilities
Accounts payable
Short(cid:2)term debt
Deferred taxes and provisions
Other current liabilities
Long(cid:2)term liabilities
Long(cid:2)term debt
Other long(cid:2)term liabilities
Total liabilities
Equity
Share capital
Retained earnings
Total liabilities and equity
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Cash flow statement, $ mln
Profit before tax
Adjustments for non(cid:2)cash items
Income tax paid
Share in associates
(Increase)/decrease in working capital
Operating cashflow
Capital expenditures
Other investments, net
Investing cashflow
Increase/(decrease) in debt
Dividends
Additional share issues (purchase)
Financing cashflow
FX and monetary effects on cash
Change in cash position
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
2013
5,835
4,115
1,720
310
2,029
(53)
74
(428)
1,312
(384)
928
32
960
2014
5,174
3,918
1,256
332
1,588
(50)
639
(1,452)
393
(93)
300
311
611
2015
2,443
2,681
(237)
94
(143)
(72)
1,832
(17)
1,505
(522)
983
1,050
2,033
2016
2,188
1,708
480
90
570
(17)
(40)
75
497
(108)
389
(35)
354
2017E
3,056
2,190
867
108
975
(13)
158
83
1,095
(199)
895
(45)
851
2018E
3,059
2,282
778
141
919
(2)
–
–
776
(143)
633
–
633
2019E
3,152
2,393
759
161
920
(2)
–
–
758
(142)
616
–
616
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
4,314
6,021
178
1,807
771
3,265
10,335
1,181
444
16
130
591
255
28
227
1,436
8,899
1,056
7,843
10,335
2013
1,317
740
(510)
(334)
(566)
647
(923)
772
(150)
(7)
(723)
–
(730)
(1)
(234)
3,172
4,965
145
731
988
3,101
8,137
576
326
16
45
188
218
23
195
794
7,344
894
6,450
8,137
2014
343
1,303
(486)
(336)
270
1,095
(737)
622
(115)
(6)
(719)
–
(725)
87
341
2,095
3,808
68
507
697
2,537
5,904
433
145
16
206
65
151
18
134
584
5,320
479
4,841
5,904
2015
1,666
(1,622)
(446)
90
(3)
(316)
(396)
787
391
(6)
(130)
–
(136)
316
256
2,212
4,113
74
544
486
3,009
6,325
383
203
16
138
26
148
12
136
530
5,794
495
5,299
6,325
2016
493
(12)
(124)
37
72
466
(296)
(396)
(692)
(6)
(0)
–
(7)
13
(220)
2,359
4,204
74
574
645
2,910
6,563
391
203
16
133
39
143
11
132
534
6,029
479
5,549
6,563
2017E
1,095
(132)
(199)
(140)
(31)
592
(404)
236
(169)
(2)
(63)
–
(64)
(175)
184
2,462
4,595
82
598
1,006
2,910
7,057
410
224
16
133
37
143
11
132
553
6,504
479
6,025
7,057
2,557
4,956
88
606
1,352
2,910
7,513
427
240
16
133
38
143
11
132
570
6,943
479
6,464
7,513
2018E
2019E
776
38
(143)
(133)
(12)
526
(290)
238
(52)
(2)
(128)
–
(129)
16
361
758
53
(142)
(124)
3
547
(290)
234
(56)
(2)
(95)
–
(97)
(49)
346
55
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Lukoil
Income statement (IFRS), $ mln
Revenues
Operating costs
EBIT
Depreciation
Impairment
EBITDA
Net interest expenses
FX gain
Net other expenses
EBT
Tax
Income before minority interest
Minority interest
Net income
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Balance sheet (IFRS), $ mln
Fixed assets and investments
Current assets
Stock and inventories
Accounts receivable
Cash and securities
Other current assets
Total assets
Current liabilities
Accounts payable
Short(cid:2)term debt
Deferred taxes and provisions
Long(cid:2)term liabilities
Long(cid:2)term debt
Other long(cid:2)term liabilities
Total liabilities
Minority interest
Equity
Share capital
Retained earnings
Total liabilities and equity
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Cash flow statement, $ mln
EBITDA
Provisions and non(cid:2)cash items
Taxes
Interest paid
Decrease in working capital
Increase in other assets
Operating cash flow
Capex
Other investments
Free cash flow
Increase in debt
Dividends
Additional share issues/(purchases)
Net cash flow
FX and monetary effects on cash
Change in cash position
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
141,452
131,205
10,247
5,756
2,561
18,564
(249)
(443)
903
10,458
(2,831)
7,627
205
7,832
144,167
137,041
7,126
8,816
1,753
17,695
(362)
(355)
363
6,772
(2,058)
4,714
32
4,746
94,816
87,333
7,483
5,943
–
13,426
(491)
1,637
(2,386)
6,243
(1,550)
4,693
(27)
4,667
78,652
72,379
6,273
4,661
–
10,933
(488)
(1,642)
(36)
4,107
(981)
3,126
(13)
3,113
95,807
88,743
7,063
5,677
–
12,740
(456)
(442)
934
7,100
(1,348)
5,752
(11)
5,740
99,728
91,558
8,170
5,697
–
13,867
(542)
–
140
7,768
(1,554)
6,215
(12)
6,202
100,414
92,491
7,923
5,993
–
13,916
(493)
–
140
7,570
(1,514)
6,056
(12)
6,044
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
86,044
23,395
8,801
11,744
1,712
1,138
109,439
13,097
9,836
1,338
1,923
17,487
9,483
8,004
30,584
277
78,578
4,589
73,989
109,439
89,041
22,759
6,154
11,387
3,004
2,214
111,800
14,212
8,538
2,168
3,506
16,236
11,361
4,875
30,448
222
81,130
4,539
76,591
111,800
52,234
16,652
4,668
6,044
3,530
2,411
68,886
9,538
6,576
830
2,132
15,011
10,966
4,046
24,549
122
44,214
1,791
42,423
68,886
61,972
20,701
6,665
5,950
4,309
3,777
82,673
13,695
10,637
963
2,095
15,766
10,554
5,212
29,461
112
53,100
2,154
50,946
82,673
65,742
20,489
7,380
5,250
3,590
4,269
86,231
13,919
11,158
666
2,095
15,811
10,554
5,257
29,729
112
56,389
2,154
54,235
86,231
67,833
21,850
6,946
5,465
5,555
3,884
89,684
13,472
10,711
666
2,095
15,811
10,554
5,257
29,283
112
60,289
2,154
58,135
89,684
69,416
24,242
7,159
5,502
7,697
3,884
93,658
13,797
11,037
666
2,095
15,811
10,554
5,257
29,608
112
63,938
2,154
61,784
93,658
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
18,564
1,805
(2,452)
(405)
(968)
(95)
16,449
(14,957)
(3,682)
(2,190)
4,125
(2,383)
(713)
(1,161)
(41)
(1,202)
17,695
(1,761)
(2,300)
(565)
(370)
2,869
15,568
(14,545)
(98)
925
2,524
(1,357)
(107)
1,985
(693)
1,292
13,426
1,519
(1,509)
(675)
2,013
(1,037)
13,736
(9,909)
1,230
5,057
(1,507)
(1,778)
(710)
1,064
(538)
526
10,933
1,386
(1,069)
(742)
1,865
(1,044)
11,330
(7,456)
(22)
3,853
(446)
(1,876)
(825)
707
72
779
12,740
1,162
(1,303)
(694)
507
(1,384)
11,028
(9,296)
–
1,732
–
(2,451)
–
(719)
–
(719)
13,867
278
(1,554)
(694)
(228)
582
12,252
(7,984)
–
4,268
–
(2,303)
–
1,965
–
1,965
13,916
336
(1,514)
(694)
75
140
12,260
(7,723)
–
4,536
–
(2,395)
–
2,142
–
2,142
56
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
Novatek
Income statement (IFRS), $ mln
Revenues
Operating costs
EBIT
Depreciation
EBITDA
Net interest expenses
FX gain
Net other expenses
EBT
Tax
Income before minority interest
Minority interest
Net income
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Balance sheet (IFRS), $ mln
Fixed assets and investments
Current assets
Stock and inventories
Accounts receivable
Cash and securities
Other current assets
Total assets
Current liabilities
Accounts payable
Short(cid:2)term debt
Deferred taxes and provisions
Long(cid:2)term liabilities
Long(cid:2)term debt
Other long(cid:2)term liabilities
Total liabilities
Minority interest
Equity
Share capital
Retained earnings
Total liabilities and equity
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Cash flow statement, $ mln
EBITDA
Taxes
Decrease in working capital
Operating cash flow
Capex
Other investments
Free cash flow
Increase/(decrease) in debt
Dividends
Additional share issues/(purchases)
Net cash flow
FX and monetary effects on cash
Other sources/(uses) of funds
Change in cash position
2013
9,367
6,027
3,339
423
3,763
(95)
(118)
(4)
4,280
(848)
3,431
2
3,433
2014
9,388
6,051
3,337
450
3,788
(21)
(599)
(1,071)
1,721
(460)
1,261
9
1,271
2015
7,791
5,499
2,292
327
2,619
63
(147)
(607)
1,613
(317)
1,295
7
1,302
2016
8,053
5,780
2,272
521
2,793
108
(402)
1,532
4,491
(620)
3,871
(109)
3,761
2017E
9,721
6,887
2,834
588
3,423
167
32
(251)
2,782
(598)
2,184
(238)
1,946
2018E
9,225
6,514
2,712
639
3,350
167
(82)
276
3,072
(551)
2,521
(237)
2,284
2019E
9,350
6,598
2,751
639
3,390
167
–
591
3,509
(575)
2,934
(234)
2,699
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
15,673
2,506
181
1,505
240
579
18,179
1,820
646
730
443
5,018
4,305
713
6,838
87
11,254
890
10,364
18,179
2013
3,763
(461)
(603)
2,699
(1,605)
(1,550)
1,094
609
(691)
(56)
957
31
(1,582)
(593)
10,177
2,250
125
615
734
776
12,427
1,443
544
728
172
4,103
3,639
464
5,546
42
6,839
470
6,369
12,427
2014
3,788
(694)
66
3,160
(1,608)
377
1,930
13
(751)
(72)
1,120
376
(81)
1,414
10,312
1,763
113
515
400
734
12,075
2,328
666
1,463
199
3,872
3,458
413
6,200
29
5,846
353
5,494
12,075
2015
2,619
(270)
(84)
2,266
(826)
(1,748)
(308)
919
(582)
(13)
16
22
(142)
(103)
13,701
2,189
149
686
796
558
15,890
1,794
634
914
245
3,253
2,659
594
5,047
154
10,689
408
10,280
15,890
2016
2,793
(423)
217
2,587
(514)
721
2,794
(1,533)
(622)
(14)
625
(147)
(302)
176
13,315
4,176
180
828
2,611
558
17,491
1,929
715
914
299
3,253
2,659
594
5,182
392
11,916
408
11,508
17,491
2017E
3,423
(599)
(37)
2,786
(366)
103
2,524
–
(923)
–
1,600
–
214
1,815
12,848
6,194
178
785
4,673
558
19,041
1,882
693
914
275
3,253
2,659
594
5,135
630
13,277
408
12,869
19,041
2018E
3,350
(553)
(3)
2,795
(328)
276
2,742
–
(959)
–
1,783
–
279
2,062
12,562
8,481
179
796
6,948
558
21,043
1,909
708
914
286
3,253
2,659
594
5,162
864
15,017
408
14,609
21,043
2019E
3,390
(577)
15
2,828
(353)
591
3,066
–
(1,103)
–
1,963
–
312
2,275
Note: Novatek income statement numbers exclude share in Yamal(cid:2)LNG as the consolidation method had not been confirmed at the time of publication.
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
57
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Rosneft
Income statement (IFRS), $ mln
Revenues
Operating costs
EBIT
Depreciation
EBITDA
EBITDA (adjusted)
Net interest expenses
FX gain
Net other expenses
EBT
Tax
Income before minority interest
Minority interest
Net income
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
146,290
128,582
17,708
11,882
29,590
29,590
(1,099)
(2,255)
1,256
15,611
(2,675)
12,936
(159)
12,777
145,887
129,287
16,600
12,099
28,699
28,699
(4,586)
267
196
12,478
(3,168)
9,310
(72)
9,238
84,808
73,194
11,614
7,458
19,072
20,493
(3,439)
1,353
(1,771)
7,757
(1,735)
6,022
(16)
6,006
74,886
65,270
9,616
7,242
16,858
18,858
(1,510)
(1,033)
(2,185)
4,888
(1,805)
3,083
(315)
2,768
99,749
89,293
10,456
9,816
20,272
23,542
(1,842)
194
(2,030)
6,778
(1,269)
5,510
(1,076)
4,433
102,166
89,089
13,077
10,125
23,201
25,881
(1,921)
–
(1,873)
9,282
(1,737)
7,545
(1,346)
6,199
105,760
90,489
15,271
10,425
25,696
27,006
(1,795)
–
694
14,170
(2,652)
11,517
(1,572)
9,946
Note: Adjusted EBITDA includes portion of revenues from supplies under prepayments not reflected in the income statement.
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Balance sheet (IFRS), $ mln
Fixed assets and investments
Current assets
Stock and inventories
Accounts receivable
Cash and securities
Other current assets
Total assets
Current liabilities
Accounts payable
Short(cid:2)term debt
Deferred taxes and provisions
Other current liabilities
Long(cid:2)term liabilities
Long(cid:2)term debt
Other long(cid:2)term liabilities
Total liabilities
Minority interest
Equity
Share capital
Retained earnings
Total liabilities and equity
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Cash flow statement, $ mln
EBITDA
Provisions and non(cid:2)cash items
Taxes
Interest paid
Decrease in working capital
Operating cash flow
Capex
Other investments
Free cash flow
Increase in debt
Dividends
Additional share issues/(purchases)
Net cash flow
FX and monetary effects on cash
Change in cash position
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
180,456
48,701
6,141
12,616
8,390
21,554
229,158
43,016
14,835
20,794
5,229
2,158
89,924
65,239
24,685
132,941
1,186
95,031
14,531
80,500
229,158
117,405
37,879
4,142
9,847
3,857
20,033
155,283
36,101
8,781
23,037
3,573
711
67,972
54,694
13,278
104,073
160
51,050
8,781
42,269
155,283
97,197
35,043
3,005
5,035
7,697
19,305
132,240
25,795
6,531
15,916
2,003
1,345
66,257
55,816
10,441
92,052
590
39,598
6,970
32,628
132,240
143,924
37,918
4,666
7,996
13,057
12,200
181,842
45,716
9,611
31,752
3,759
594
74,699
57,702
16,997
120,415
6,875
54,553
9,958
44,595
181,842
149,246
35,624
6,383
4,919
12,122
12,200
184,870
44,657
6,902
31,752
5,409
594
74,356
57,702
16,654
119,012
7,951
57,907
9,958
47,949
184,870
152,129
36,933
6,368
4,758
13,606
12,200
189,062
43,990
6,308
31,752
5,336
594
73,885
57,702
16,184
117,876
9,297
61,889
9,958
51,931
189,062
154,198
42,623
6,468
4,636
19,318
12,200
196,821
44,049
6,264
31,752
5,440
594
73,168
57,702
15,466
117,217
10,869
68,735
9,958
58,778
196,821
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
29,590
(3,399)
(2,545)
(1,752)
11,760
33,654
(17,513)
(53,680)
16,141
33,481
(2,592)
1,007
(5,643)
480
(5,163)
28,699
8,742
(5,074)
(2,255)
13,183
43,295
(17,966)
(13,631)
25,329
(9,423)
(3,748)
(2,531)
(4,005)
1,724
(2,281)
19,072
3,023
(1,980)
(2,466)
17,929
36,999
(10,085)
(2,889)
26,914
(14,735)
(1,377)
(1,521)
6,392
791
7,183
16,858
1,161
(554)
(2,642)
(5,475)
11,348
(11,086)
(4,577)
262
10,176
(1,935)
2,712
6,639
(1,705)
4,934
20,272
3,710
(1,612)
(3,578)
462
22,524
(15,571)
39
6,953
–
(1,079)
(3,578)
2,335
–
2,335
23,201
3,631
(2,208)
(3,578)
(1,650)
22,077
(12,742)
624
9,335
–
(2,217)
(3,578)
4,164
–
4,164
25,696
6,019
(3,370)
(3,578)
(938)
25,139
(12,223)
783
12,916
–
(3,099)
(3,578)
7,022
–
7,022
58
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
Surgutneftegaz
Income statement (IFRS), $ mln
Revenues
Operating costs
EBIT
Depreciation
EBITDA
Net interest expenses
Monetary gain/(loss)
Net other expenses
EBT
Tax
Income before minority interest
Net income
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Balance sheet (IFRS), $ mln
Fixed assets and investments
Current assets
Stock and inventories
Accounts receivable
Cash and securities
Other current assets
Total assets
Current liabilities
Accounts payable
Def. taxes and provisions
Other current liabilities
Long(cid:2)term liabilities
Other long(cid:2)term liabilities
Total liabilities
Minority interest
Equity
Share capital
Retained earnings
Total liabilities and equity
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Cash flow statement, $ mln
EBITDA
Provisions and non(cid:2)cash items
Taxes
Interest received
Decrease in working capital
Operating cash flow
Capex
Other investments
Free cash flow
Dividends
Additional share issues/(purchases)
Net cash flow
FX and monetary effects on cash
Change in cash position
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
2013
41,305
34,492
6,813
1,522
8,334
1,524
2,505
24
10,866
(2,057)
8,809
8,809
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
35,711
31,324
4,387
1,920
6,307
1,613
20,204
(42)
26,162
(4,529)
21,633
21,633
20,946
16,896
4,050
1,150
5,200
1,503
9,067
6
14,625
(2,494)
12,131
12,131
18,356
14,458
3,899
1,157
5,056
1,615
(6,440)
(33)
(959)
135
(825)
(826)
22,285
18,027
4,259
1,189
5,448
1,231
972
–
6,461
(1,292)
5,169
5,176
21,912
17,616
4,296
1,190
5,486
736
–
–
5,032
(1,006)
4,026
4,031
21,797
17,753
4,044
1,188
5,232
765
–
–
4,809
(962)
3,847
3,853
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
33,613
38,892
1,671
2,532
33,145
1,543
72,504
3,671
1,202
1,190
1,280
6,127
6,127
9,799
5
62,700
6,459
56,241
72,504
2013
8,334
326
(1,143)
1,315
308
9,141
(5,575)
(3,383)
3,566
(892)
205
(504)
7
(497)
20,665
38,101
1,163
1,074
34,521
1,343
58,766
3,161
766
1,298
1,097
3,896
3,896
7,058
3
51,706
3,777
47,929
58,766
2014
6,307
663
(3,101)
1,944
(0)
5,813
(4,102)
(2,390)
1,710
(935)
306
(1,309)
255
(1,054)
17,704
37,889
1,041
817
35,314
717
55,593
3,034
710
914
1,410
3,403
3,403
6,437
3
49,153
2,915
46,238
55,593
2015
5,200
163
(2,456)
1,889
115
4,909
(2,791)
(136)
2,119
(1,325)
440
1,097
24
1,121
22,945
41,707
1,403
1,431
37,739
1,133
64,652
3,502
806
828
1,868
4,349
4,349
7,850
4
56,798
3,503
53,295
64,652
2016
5,056
65
(795)
966
(134)
5,157
(2,715)
(1,278)
2,442
(1,163)
297
298
(50)
248
24,969
44,357
999
1,738
40,487
1,133
69,326
3,450
487
1,095
1,868
4,349
4,349
7,799
(3)
61,530
3,503
58,027
69,326
2017E
5,448
30
(1,292)
1,231
47
5,463
(3,243)
–
2,220
(444)
–
1,776
–
1,776
26,797
45,816
917
1,708
42,057
1,133
72,613
3,408
451
1,089
1,868
4,349
4,349
7,757
(8)
64,864
3,503
61,361
72,613
2018E
5,486
28
(1,006)
736
70
5,314
(3,047)
–
2,267
(697)
–
1,570
–
1,570
28,689
47,161
929
1,699
43,399
1,133
75,850
3,414
457
1,089
1,868
4,349
4,349
7,763
(13)
68,101
3,503
64,598
75,850
2019E
5,232
29
(962)
765
2
5,067
(3,109)
–
1,958
(616)
–
1,342
–
1,342
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
59
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Tatneft
Income statement (US GAAP), $ mln
Revenues
Operating costs
EBIT
Depreciation
EBITDA
Net interest expenses
FX gain
Net other expenses
EBT
Tax
Income before minority interest
Minority interest
Net income
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Balance sheet (US GAAP), $ mln
Fixed assets and investments
Current assets
Stock and inventories
Accounts receivable
Cash and securities
Other current assets
Total assets
Current liabilities
Accounts payable
Short(cid:2)term debt
Other current liabilities
Long(cid:2)term liabilities
Long(cid:2)term debt
Other long(cid:2)term liabilities
Total liabilities
Minority interest
Equity
Share capital
Retained earnings
Total liabilities and equity
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Cash flow statement, $ mln
EBITDA
Provisions and non(cid:2)cash items
Taxes
Decrease in working capital
Increase in other assets
Operating cash flow
Capex
Other investments
Free cash flow
Increase in debt
Interest paid
Dividends
Additional share issues/(purchases)
Net cash flow
FX and monetary effects on cash
Change in cash position
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
20,289
17,019
3,270
607
3,840
(112)
(15)
29
3,173
(719)
2,454
(233)
2,220
17,155
14,210
2,945
553
3,546
35
313
21
3,314
(700)
2,614
(146)
2,468
10,830
8,653
2,178
410
2,679
59
34
19
2,289
(530)
1,760
(113)
1,647
10,041
7,842
2,199
324
2,561
23
(50)
(35)
2,137
(527)
1,610
20
1,630
12,244
9,674
2,570
415
2,985
55
(21)
46
2,649
(555)
2,094
5
2,099
12,270
9,426
2,843
418
3,261
55
–
–
2,898
(715)
2,183
5
2,188
12,405
9,596
2,809
436
3,245
57
–
–
2,866
(707)
2,159
5
2,164
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
15,872
4,621
898
1,584
926
1,213
20,493
2,528
1,417
1,111
–
2,643
389
2,254
5,171
686
14,635
3,017
11,618
20,493
2013
3,840
143
(719)
41
277
3,582
(1,784)
(33)
1,765
(740)
(112)
(613)
(31)
270
8
277
9,818
3,210
577
819
768
1,047
13,028
1,217
932
282
3
1,462
229
1,232
2,679
467
9,882
1,764
8,118
13,028
2014
3,546
592
(700)
200
(200)
3,439
(1,622)
(241)
1,577
(875)
35
(484)
(46)
207
41
248
8,499
2,459
440
825
342
852
10,959
946
846
72
27
990
177
813
1,935
403
8,621
1,330
7,291
10,959
2015
2,679
138
(530)
(132)
67
2,222
(1,517)
(439)
266
(210)
59
(392)
(32)
(309)
18
(291)
12,564
5,482
549
1,053
1,271
2,608
18,046
4,721
1,142
318
3,261
1,638
574
1,063
6,359
89
11,598
1,599
9,999
18,046
2016
2,561
54
(527)
46
79
2,212
(1,428)
720
784
(121)
23
(369)
(107)
930
(22)
908
13,858
5,722
601
1,271
1,242
2,608
19,580
5,163
1,367
534
3,261
1,428
353
1,075
6,591
84
12,905
1,599
11,306
19,580
2017E
2,985
34
(555)
(48)
–
2,416
(1,708)
–
708
–
55
(792)
–
(29)
–
(29)
14,937
5,748
599
1,275
1,265
2,608
20,684
5,092
1,299
532
3,261
1,440
352
1,088
6,532
79
14,073
1,599
12,474
20,684
2018E
3,261
14
(715)
(75)
–
2,485
(1,497)
–
988
–
55
(1,020)
–
23
0
23
15,917
5,939
615
1,302
1,414
2,608
21,857
5,156
1,363
532
3,261
1,453
352
1,101
6,609
73
15,174
1,599
13,575
21,857
2019E
3,245
13
(707)
22
–
2,572
(1,417)
–
1,156
–
57
(1,064)
–
149
–
149
60
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
OCTOBER 2017
Transneft
Income statement (IFRS), $ mln
Revenues
Operating costs
EBIT
Depreciation
EBITDA
Net interest expenses
FX gain
Net other expenses
EBT
Tax
Income before minority interest
Minority interest
Net income
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Balance sheet (IFRS), $ mln
Fixed assets and investments
Current assets
Stock and inventories
Accounts receivable
Cash and securities
Other current assets
Total assets
Current liabilities
Accounts payable
Short(cid:2)term debt
Long(cid:2)term liabilities
Long(cid:2)term debt
Other long(cid:2)term liabilities
Total liabilities
Minority interest
Equity
Share capital
Retained earnings
Total liabilities and equity
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
Cash flow statement, $ mln
Cash receipts from customers
Cash paid to suppliers
Interest paid
Income tax paid
Operating cash flow
Capital expenditures
Other investments, net
Investing cash flow
Increase in debt
Dividends
Additional share issues (purchases)
Financing cash flow
FX and monetary effects on cash
Change in cash position
Cash at beginning of period
Cash at end of period
Source: Company, Sberbank CIB Investment Research
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
23,543
15,665
7,878
3,226
11,104
(646)
(186)
(375)
6,672
(1,689)
4,982
(160)
4,822
20,370
14,143
6,226
2,968
9,195
(466)
(956)
(1,681)
3,123
(995)
2,128
(26)
2,102
13,425
9,540
3,885
2,274
6,158
(153)
(791)
(93)
2,848
(402)
2,446
(1)
2,445
12,733
8,541
4,192
1,920
6,112
(535)
603
219
4,479
(1,027)
3,452
(1)
3,451
14,657
10,000
4,656
2,214
6,870
(429)
(190)
289
4,327
(992)
3,335
(1)
3,334
14,712
10,034
4,678
2,470
7,148
(540)
–
289
4,427
(1,015)
3,412
(1)
3,411
15,333
10,366
4,967
2,642
7,610
(448)
–
289
4,808
(1,102)
3,706
(1)
3,705
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
48,172
16,173
848
2,943
3,184
9,199
64,345
6,929
4,012
2,917
17,439
14,732
2,707
24,368
772
39,206
9
39,196
64,345
31,583
12,398
533
1,790
2,010
8,065
43,981
6,821
3,587
3,234
12,829
10,261
2,568
19,650
471
23,861
5
23,856
43,981
27,691
8,794
481
1,007
1,272
6,033
36,485
3,299
2,181
1,118
12,770
10,750
2,020
16,069
23
20,392
4
20,388
36,485
36,783
8,830
510
1,218
1,230
5,872
45,613
4,844
3,047
1,798
12,472
9,768
2,704
17,317
30
28,267
5
28,261
45,613
39,509
8,540
613
1,429
518
5,981
48,050
5,521
3,677
1,844
11,886
8,909
2,977
17,407
30
30,612
5
30,607
48,050
40,783
8,162
606
1,407
168
5,981
48,945
5,316
3,472
1,844
10,408
7,644
2,764
15,724
31
33,190
5
33,185
48,945
41,549
9,119
617
1,467
1,055
5,981
50,668
5,410
3,567
1,844
9,183
6,420
2,764
14,594
32
36,042
5
36,037
50,668
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017E
2018E
2019E
25,116
(16,158)
(1,089)
2,296
10,165
(6,972)
(1,502)
(8,474)
(586)
(144)
(392)
(1,123)
102
671
2,766
3,184
21,824
(14,796)
(884)
507
6,651
(7,952)
2,409
(5,543)
(2,126)
(218)
0
(2,343)
844
(392)
3,184
2,010
14,246
(9,340)
(730)
1,005
5,181
(5,262)
2,009
(3,253)
(1,093)
(47)
(1,325)
(2,465)
170
(366)
2,010
1,272
13,453
(8,784)
(697)
935
4,907
(4,832)
998
(3,833)
(761)
(198)
(146)
(1,104)
(175)
(206)
1,272
1,230
14,445
(7,259)
(765)
(992)
5,430
(5,582)
–
(5,582)
900
(988)
–
(89)
–
(241)
1,230
518
14,734
(7,762)
(847)
(1,015)
5,110
(3,744)
–
(3,744)
(1,550)
(833)
–
(2,384)
–
(1,018)
518
168
15,274
(7,640)
(739)
(1,102)
5,793
(3,408)
–
(3,408)
(1,500)
(853)
–
(2,353)
–
31
168
1,055
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
61
OCTOBER 2017
RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS – TOMORROW IS A DISTANT MEMORY
Disclosure appendix
IMPORTANT US REGULATORY DISCLOSURES
Within the last 12 months, an affiliate of Sberbank CIB USA managed or co(cid:2)managed a public
offering of the securities of Bashneft, Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Transneft.
Within the last 12 months, an affiliate of Sberbank CIB USA has received compensation for
investment banking services from Bashneft, Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Transneft.
In the next three months, an affiliate of Sberbank CIB USA expects to receive or intends to seek
compensation for investment banking services from Gazprom Neft, Transneft.
An affiliate of Sberbank CIB USA makes a market in the securities of Gazprom, Gazprom Neft,
Lukoil, Novatek, Rosneft, Surgutneftegaz, Tatneft, Transneft.
The research analysts, strategists, or research associates principally responsible for the preparation
of this research report have received compensation based upon various factors, including quality of
research, investor client feedback, stock picking, competitive factors, firm revenues and overall
investment banking revenues.
Analyst certification
The following analyst(s) hereby certify that the views expressed in this research report accurately
reflect such research analyst’s personal views about the subject securities and issuers and that no
part of his or her compensation was, is, or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific
recommendations or views contained in the research report: Alex Fak, Anna Kotelnikova, Valery
Nesterov.
62
SBERBANK CIB INVESTMENT RESEARCH
Senior Management
Head of Sberbank CIB
Co(cid:2)Head of Sberbank CIB
Igor Bulantsev
Head of Global Markets Department,
Aleksandr Bazarov
Vice(cid:2)President
Andrey Shemetov
Research Department
+7 (495) 258 0511
Head of Research
Alexander Kudrin
+7 (495) 933 9847
Equity Strategy
IT
Chief Equity Strategist
Andrey Kuznetsov
+7 (495) 933 9868
Senior Analyst
Julia Gordeyeva, CFA
+7 (495) 933 9846
Equity Strategist
Cole Akeson
+7 (495) 933 9851
Senior Analyst
Igor Vasilyev
Junior Analyst
Aleksey Ryabushko
+7 (495) 933 9842
+7 (495) 258 0511
Economy
Chief Economist
Senior Economist
Economist
Anton Stroutchenevski
+7 (495) 933 9843
Real Estate, Construction
Rodion Lomivorotov, CFA
+7 (495) 787 2364
Senior Analyst
Julia Gordeyeva, CFA
+7 (495) 933 9846
Junior Economist
Artem Vinogradov
+7 (495) 258 0541
Junior Analyst
Sergei Konygin
+7 (495) 933 9848
Senior Analyst
Igor Vasilyev
Aleksey Ryabushko
+7 (495) 933 9842
+7 (495) 258 0511
Oil and Gas
Senior Analyst
Analyst
Junior Analyst
Alex Fak
+7 (495) 933 9829
Senior Analyst
Igor Vasilyev
+7 (495) 933 9842
Valery Nesterov
+7 (495) 933 9832
Senior Analyst
Julia Gordeyeva, CFA
+7 (495) 933 9846
Anna Kotelnikova
+7 (495) 787 2382
Junior Analyst
Aleksey Ryabushko
+7 (495) 258 0511
Transport, Industrials
Metals and Mining, Chemicals
FICC Strategy
Senior Analyst
Analyst
Financials
Senior Analyst
Irina Lapshina
Kirill Plastinin
+7 (495) 933 9852
Chief Strategist FX/IR
Tom Levinson
+7 (495) 258 0511
Junior Strategist FX/IR
Yuri Popov
Commodity Strategist
Mikhail Sheybe
+7 (495) 933 9858
+7 (495) 787 2383
+7 (495) 258 0521
Andrew Keeley
+44 (20) 7936 0439
Junior Strategist FI
Alexander Golinsky
+ 7 (495) 258 0511
Fixed Income Credit Research
Senior Credit Analyst
Alexey Bulgakov
+7 (495) 933 9866
Credit Analyst
Credit Analyst
Junior Analyst
Ekaterina Sidorova, CFA
+7 (495) 933 9834
Alexander Sychev, CFA
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Nikolay Minko
+ 7 (495) 933 9857
Telecoms, Media and Internet
Svetlana Sukhanova
+7 (495) 933 9835
Maria Sukhanova
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Mikhail Krasnoperov
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Andrey Krylov
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Igor Vasilyev
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Aleksey Ryabushko
+7 (495) 258 0511
Senior Analyst
Analyst
Consumer
Senior Analyst
Junior Analyst
Utilities
Senior Analyst
Junior Analyst
Turkish Research
Head of Turkish Research
Sinan Goksen
+90 (212) 348 9075
Strategy
Industrials
Head of Research
Sinan Goksen
+90 (212) 348 9075
Senior Analyst
Sadrettin Bagci
+90 (212) 348 9088
Consumer
Assistant Analyst
Financials
Director
Conglomerates
Head of Research
Director
Senior Analyst
Oil and Gas, Utilities
Sinan Goksen
Selim Kunter
Alper Akalin
+90 (212) 348 9080
Director
Behlul Katas, CFA
+90 (212) 348 9081
+90 (212) 348 9075
Telecoms
+90 (212) 348 9078
Director
Behlul Katas, CFA
+90 (212) 348 9081
Transport
Director
Real Estate
Director
Selim Kunter
+90 (212) 348 9078
Sadrettin Bagci
+90 (212) 348 9088
Director
Selim Kunter
+90 (212) 348 9078
Metals and Mining
Senior Analyst
Alper Akalin
+90 (212) 348 9080
Alper Akalin
Kivanc Dundar
+90 (212) 348 9080
+90 (212) 348 9076
Head Office, Moscow
Sberbank CIB USA, Inc
SIB (Cyprus) Limited
4, Romanov Pereulok
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Carnegie Hall Tower, 152 West 57th Street
44th floor, New York, NY 10019
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